Some Concepts underlying Jain Logic and Philosophy

SR No.: 250309
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: S S Barlinge
Publisher: Z_Pushkarmuni_Abhinandan_Granth_012012.pdf
Total Pages: 4
Language: English
Classification: Article & Philosophy
File Size: 626 Kb

Page 4

* 78@ sit goney for traran en ++ ++ ++ something does not exist) is different from not possibly something exists (i.e., it is not possible that something exists). Both possibly something exists and possibly something does not exist are affirmative statements. On the other hand, in the set, possibly something exists, and not possibly something exists, only one is affirmative and the other is negative. (Here not possible is really equivalent of impossible). These two therefore are non-compatible and cannot be asserted together. How it is possible that something 'is' and it is also possible that something 'is not and still it is possible to doubt whether we can assert any position about it. Thus it is possible to say that possibly a thing 'is' and it is possible to make an assertion about it and also a thing 'is not' and it is possible to make such an assertion. It is also possible that a thing 'is' and it is not possible to make an assertion and a thing is not' and it is not possible to make that assertion. Thus in all you will get the seven compatible alternatives : (1) possibly p, (2) possibly not p, (3) possibly p, possibly not p; (4) not possible to describe, (5) possibly p, but not possible to describe, (6) possibly not-p, but not possible to describe, (7) possibly p, possibly not-p but not possible to describe. Thus possibility has a scope over both describability, (the very word describable means possible to describe) is, and is not. This means that all the alternatives which the Jain Logic takes for granted are mutually compatible and can be explained in terms of 'or'. This is what is stated by the Jain Logicians in a formula Syat asti, Syat nasti, Syat Asti-nasti, Syat avaktavya, Syat Asti avaktavya, Syat nasti avaktavya, Syat astinasti avaktavya. In all these cases the scope of the proposition is determined by the modality 'possibility'. Modality impossibility-impossibility to assert-is finally governed by the modality possibility alone. Jain Logic seems to take into consideration first the predicates 'Asti' and 'Nasti' and determine the scope of these two predicates by possible. As soon as Syat is added to 'Asti' and "Nasti' the incompatibility between them is completely got rid of and both of them become possible. Then this new proposition is contrasted with describability or assertibility and its opposite. Describability and its opposite emerge as two values. But these two values are merely the combination of possible--impossible and assertion--negation. Very soon it can be seen that which is impossible to describe is quite compatible both with what 'is' and what 'is not'. This compatibility tells us that it is the modal predicate 'possible' which is governing all these modal propositions in Jain Logic. Finally, the scope of all varieties of possible is determined by possible only. It cannot, therefore, be said that Syadvada as such is an attempt towards the formulation of Many-valued Logic. As a matter of fact the opposite appears to be the caseeven to deny the dichotomy between an assertion and negation or describability and non-describability and bring them all under one modality--possible'. In Jain Logic we also come across a word called Bhanga. Bhanga literally means breaking. But it is a symbol of incompatibility. If Saptabhangi is taken literally, it really means sevenfold incompatibilities and in such a case Saptabhangi would give a Logic of seven or manyvalues. But what we get in Syadvada is the doctrine of seven fold compatibilities. Perhaps at some stage Jains had something like sevenfold incompatibilities in their mind. We know that one thing is different from another thing. This is due to Bhanga. This 'is' and 'is not will be the two Bhangas and if there is not a certainty about a ti be some indecision and this will be the third alternative or Bhanga. But Jain philosophers do not seem to talk about assertions and negations except as a summation of all possibles. They thus finally seem to be governed by only one predicate (or value) 'the possible'. When the Jains talk of Avaktavya it is true that the concept of indecision must be at least vaguely in their mind. In that case there would be really three values, truth, false, and indecisive. Had the Jains not talked of Syad, then Asti, Nasti and Anirvachana or Ayaktavyata would have given us three values and we would have been able to base Logic on these three values. Prof. Dhruva in his 'Introduction to Syadvadamanjari says that in the Bhagavatisutra only three Bhangas or values (and not seven) are mentioned and perhaps in the beginning this was the case. Inst possibly is possibly is not' and 'possibly indescribable' if we say, 'this is possible', 'this is impossible' and 'this is indescribable' we would get the three Bhangas ; but then they will not be compatible, as they will not be governed by the truth function V'. Syadvada, as it appears today, does not seem to be the Theory of Many-valued Logic, although perhaps Jain logicians did vaguely consider a set of two values- possible to describe and not possible to describe at one level and another set of values is and is not at another level.