Indian Antiquary Vol 59

SR No.: 032551
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Richard Carnac Temple, Charles E A W Oldham, S Krishnaswami Aiyangar, Devadatta Ramkrishna Bhandarka
Publisher: Swati Publications
Publication Year: 1986
Total Pages: 380
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 16 MB

Page 191

SEPTEMBER, 1930)
SAMKARA ON THE CONDITIONS OF KNOWLEDGE
175
to the 'I,' the self-conscious subject. Whether in perception, as I see a tree'; cr in inference, as I infer fire from smoke'; or in memory, as I remember this '; or in recognition, as
I recognize this '; or in willing, as 'I wish to have this '; or in feeling, as 'I feel such and such '-everywhere the 'I' is present. Try however you may, you can never get rid of the 'I.' If we try to do away with the 'I,' or, in other words, if our experience ceases to refer to the 'I'--the form of knowledge would not be 'I see a tree,' or 'I feel pain,' which, in other words, means that I shall have no knowledge.' Samkara, therefore, says in his Gita-bhasya : “Unless one knows himself as 'I,' he cannot make any attempt to know anything."'10 The same thing has been put by Fichte in his Science of Knowledge. “The truth is," says he, “that you cannot think anything at all without adding in your thought the Ego as self-conscious."11
Samkara, in his introduction to the Satra-bhagya, gives us a deeper reason when he says that "the popular use of 'I' and 'Mine' (i.e., self-consciousness) is due to a mixing up of the real (Atman) and the unreal (Andtman=body, mind, eto."),1% and also that “One cannot have the qualities of the subject unless one has the wrong notion that the body, senses, etc., are identical with or belong to the self of the knowing person."18 What Samkara means is that self-consciousness depends upon the union of the Atman and the body, senses, etc.; and also that without self-consciousness no knowledge is possible. Vacaspati comments on the second statement thus : "To be subject means to possess knowledge." This requires that the subject must have independence (svdlantrya). Independence means that the subject uses the means of right knowledge though it cannot be compelled to do so. But pure consciousness, which is free from activity, cannot be said to use the means of right knowledge. So the subject, in order that it can use the means of right knowledge, must be due to a mixing up of the Atman and the body, mind, etc."14 The matter is of much importance and requires explanation.
The origin of self-consciousness, as we found above, has been attributed by Sankara to the identification of the Atman with our body, mind, eto. I eat sweets,' and 'I am wounded' -such statements we always use. It cannot be said that the Alman in such cases actually eats or is wounded, for we perceive that our tongue and skin are in direct touch with the dish and the knife. How then can we say that I am wounded' or 'I eat sweets ?' Does the 'I' eat or get wounded? The reply, that sensations are carried to the Atman, as a psychclogist might say, only pushes the question further to the brain centres, but does not solve it, for the brain centres are not identical with Ātman. The pineal gland of Descartes may be a clever device, but the fundamental difficulty remains the same. The fact is that the Atman identifies himself with the tongue and the body; and had it been otherwise-had not the Atman identified himself with these two-he would not have said 'I eat sweets' or 'I am wounded. Our statement becomes clear if we see that if by detachment we separate the Atman from these, then neither of the statements is possible. The physical facts of eating or being wounded can belong to us only if we identify ourselves with the body, etc., and, if not, the physical fact remains confined to the physical world. The fact that people commit suicide, shows that they greatly detach themselves from the body, etc., and try to fly away from what they think to be an iron cage.' But these very people, before they can so detach themselves from their body, would have shuddered at anybody's attempt to kill them, and would have said 'I won't be killed. Let us take another example-'I am well,' 'I am ill.' What is the matter here? The illness or well-being belongs to the body, but we say 'I am well' or 'I am ill.' This is due to the identification of our Atman with the gross body, so that the well-being or illness of the body becomes a property of the Atman as well. The
10 Gitd-bhagya, 2. 18. 11 Fichte, Science of Knowledge, Chapter on Fundamental Principles of Knowledge, $1. 12 Introduction to Brahmasdira-bhdaya.
13 Ibid. 14 Bhamati, Commentary to Samkara's Introduction to Brahmastra-bhd pya.