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JULY, 1930 1
BHAMAHA AND DINNAGA
145
fundamental aspects of pakşa, viz., prasiddha-dharmin. This kind of pakşábkésc is not in Dinnåga, but is to be found in Sankarasvamin, and, as is evidenced by the commentary of K'wei. chi on the Nyaya praveśa, was largely discussed in logical schools after the great logician. One of the possible ways to avoid this fallacy was found in the theory of the avadharaya or specification, viz., the atman, in which we believe, or in which you believe, etc.
Anyhow it is worth mentioning that the example given by Bh&maha as the second case of pakşdbhasa clearly shows that it was taken from some Buddhist vade mecum.
(g) Trairúpya of the helu.- I have shown elsewhere17 that Dinnåga cannot be considered as the author of this theory, which we meet also in the Tarka-seistras, certainly anterior to him, and was perhaps contained also in the Vadavidhi. Anyhow the definition of vipaksa as addhyavydvrtti was not of Dinnaga, who in Nydyamukha as well as in Pramanasamuccaya contests the validity of such definition. We find vipaksavyárrtti in Tarkašastra.
(h) Dyslânta.-The first definition, sådhyasadhanadharmábhyam, may be compared with that given by the author of Vadavidhi : tayoh sambandhanidarsanam dratanta quoted by Uddyotakara (NV., p. 137, 1. 3). The second is beyond any doubt of Dinnaga, and it is reproduced almost literally by Bhamaha. He says:
(v. 27) Sadhyena linganugatis tadabhave ca ndatite sthapyale yena drståntahand the definition of Dinnaga, in Nydyamukha and Pramdndsamuccaya, quoted and refuted by Uddyotakara (NV., p. 137) in its Sanskrit original, runs thus -
sådhyenanugamo hetuh addhyabhave ca ndstita.
(1) Jatis.-The Jatis were reduced by Dinnaga to 14 only in Nyâyamukha and Pramdnasamuccaya. According to Sankarasvåmin they are considered as sadhanadogodbhavanani; and sadhanadora is nyinatva, etc., viz., adhikya ; this is just the theory that we find in Bhamaha, though in his case mention of sádharmyasamadaya18 is still to be found, just as in Dinnaga's works.
II. Now if we are to sum up the results of this comparison of Bhamaha's logical chapter with Nyaya theories known to us, it appears evident that no trace of Dharmakirti can be found in Kavyalankara. All the doctrines upon which Jacobi founded his conclusions, viz., that Bh&maha is dependent on Nydyabindu, after closer examination prove to be not peculiar to Dharmakîrti but anterior to him. We may add that not a single theory, proper to Dharmakîrti, can be traced in Kavydlankana. On the other hand, Bhamaha refers twice quite unmistakably to Vagabandhu, or better, to the author of Vadavidhi, whose doctrines are Bo often alluded to and refuted in Pramanasamuccaya. And it is known that the Vadavidhi was completely superseded by the big work of Dinnaga and the logical activity of his followers, go that after DinnAga it is only occasionally alluded to for polemical purposes, e.g., by Uddyotakara, but it did not influence in any way the Nydya theories of post-Dinnåga time. On the other hand, Dharmakîrti, with his Pramánardrttika, Pramanaviniscaya and Nyayabindu, very soon took the prominent part, and after him Pramanasamuccaya and its author were left in oblivion. V&caspati and Jayanta as well as the Jaina logicians are always engaged in refuting Dharmakirti's viows, and only occasionally refer to Dinnaga's doctrines. But from the comparison that we made in the first part of this paper it appears that Bhamaha's views reflect chiefly the older Nydya theories, such as those expounded by the Vådavidhi and Pramanasamuccaya or Nydyamukha, from which texts he seems to differ in a few points only. The fact that he still quotes from Vadaridhi and ignores the nine paksabhdeas of Sankarasvâmin
17 Cf. JRAS., 1929, p. 479. . . 18 This must be the reading, and not camadhayah of the printed text,