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THE INDIAN ANTIQUARY
(Arrit, 1924
through the scripture, is absolutely valid.41 Empirical knowledge thus stands on a lower footing than metaphysical knowledge. It is provisional and true only in a particular
uniterac,' go to speak. Any discrepancy between the two is to be explained by reference to the distinctive spheres to which they belong 12 All empirical knowledge, for instance presupposeg variety but the scripture teaches unity; yet there is really no conflict between them, for empirical knowledge while it involves a reference to cuality does not also vouch for its validity.43 The viow which B. took of this matter was altogether different. To him both empirical and revealed knowlodge are equally valid and in exactly the same sense. Perception not only gives diversity but also validates it; for nothing that is properly ascertained by a pramana can ever be otherwise than true.44 Moreover, the scripture itself confirms the truth of diversity in such of its portions as describe Creation. 46 And it very properly emphasises in its purely metaphysical portions the unity underlying it which we commovly miss. B. accordingly concluded that Brahman, the ultimato Reality should exhibit both the fcatures and be a unity-in-diversity (draitâdvaita).46 This view is termed pramâna-samuccaya by Ananda-jñâna in one place 47- Saúkara explains the reference to variety in the Upanisads as a mere anuvada of what is empirically known and so, as carrying no new authority with it. Thus he restricts the scope of the scripture, as an independent and primary pramana, to the teaching of unity alone.
III.
As the doctrine of unity is the specific teaching of the Upanigads, it is not only perceptual knowledge that is provisionally true, according to Sankara, but also the subject matter of the karma-kända of the Veda. Hence one that desires to realise Brahman should rise above the notions of obligation implied in that kanda and renounce the world completely. B. follows here the same course as before and tries to co-ordinate the teachings of both the kândas recommending the combination of jñána with, karma for attaining moksa, 18 In other words, pramaņa-samuccaya on the theoretical side has for him its counterpart of jñanakarma-samuccaya on the practical. Just as in the former case, neither Perception nor Revelation is alone to be taken as valid but both, so here also both karma and jñana should he regarded as the means of mokşa, for both alike are prescribed in the scripture. Sankara too does not discard karma ; but, as is well known, he is not a samuccaya-vadin. Karma, according to him is only indirectly or remotely useful in securing mokaa. It is the means of jnana which brings about mokra, unaided.
According to all Vedantins, virakti or 'detachment' is necessary before one qualifies for mokra. But while Sankara looks to dosa-darsana in the objects of our desire as its means, B. considers that result as possible only through bhoga. It is only by learning, through actual experience, the real worth of all things that in one way or another minister to our lesires that we can grow indifferent to them. This view is based upon a very ancient Indian
41 Seo e... Vartika, p. 249, st. 917 ff. Compare also Vedanta-paribhdad, ch. vii.
4 Seo Sankara on Br. Up. II, 1, 20 (p. 296) : Pramandntardvisayameva hi pramdydntaram vid. payati. See also Tika on Sankara's commentary on Br. Up. I, iv, 7 (p. 121): Pratyak ddindmanamavisayatvacca gamasya bhinna-visayakatayd nd nayomilho virodhaḥ.
43 See Vartika, p. 263, et. 986, pp. 1982-4, st. 84-94. 14 See Vartika, Tika on st. 36 (p. 1930): Svanubhaudddvaitasydvaitasya sruti-vasat (pramanyam). 45 See Vartika, p. 1954, st. 32.
48 Vartika, V, i, st. 30-36. *7 Ibid., Tika on st. 913 (p. 248). This should not be confounded with pramdya-samplava, such for example as is described by VAtayâyana in his commentary on Nydyd-Satras, 1, 1, 3.
18 Seo Vartika, pp. 768-9, st. 1700-1. Consult generally on this subject of sam uccaya, Vartika, I, iv, 1702 ff., III, ii, 41 ff. and IV, iv, 719 ff.