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AUGUST, 1923]
BUCKLER'S POLITICAL THEORY OF THE INDIAN MUTINY
201
to the loyalty of the Mughal Emperor, while at the same moment it masqueraded in Europe as the British Government and the "protector" of a pensioned king of Delhi.
(3) The duplicity of Wellesly, as expressed in (2), was accentuated by his successors, who owing to ignorance of Indian languages and conditions adopted a policy which the Mughal emperor could not but interpret as high treason, and which therefore ultimately drove the Native army to revolt.
In regard to (1), it seems to me impossible in the light of known facts, to accept the view that the Mughal Empire was an effective source of political authority down to the date of the outbreak. To be effective, a government surely must be possessed of the power to impose its will upon its vassals and subjects, and upon any outsider who dares to infringe its rights. If it has not this power, obviously it cannot fall within the category of effective government. What are the historical facts? In 1756 Ahmad Shah Durrani sacked Delhi; in 1760 the British were supreme in Bengal, the titular Nawab of the province being merely the creature and protégé of the Company: in 1764 was fought the battle of Buxar, in which the English defeated the Emperor of all India and his titular prime minister. As a result of that battle, the Emperor-a homeless fugitive-made his submission, and, in return for an an. nuity of twenty-six lakhs from the Bengal revenues and the districts of Allahabad and Kora, agreed to resign all further claims on the revenues and to confirm formally the right of the Company to the territories in their possession. He thus became in substance a pensioner of the Company, hardly a sound basis on which to found a claim to effective political authority. In 1769 the Marathas, having recovered from their defeat, again crossed the Narbada, raided Rajputana and Rohilkand, and began to intrigue with the puppet Emperor, who was subsisting at Allahabad on the money paid to him by the Company. The Marathas offered to place him on the throne of Delhi, and on his accepting this proposal, he was escorted to Delhi in 1771 by Mahadaji Sindia, who became in practice his jailor. He was forced by the Marathas to hand over the two districts of Allahabad and Kora, which had been given to him as an act of grace by Clive. Thereupon Hastings ordered the discontinuance of his allowance,-an act which, as Mr. Roberts remarks, is supported by "all temperate and responsible opinion." From 1784 onwards Sindia had complete control of the aged Emperor, who was practically forced to issue patents appointing the Peshwa supreme Vicegerent of the Empire and Sindia himself the Peshwa's Deputy. "So by a curious turn of the political wheel, the Mughal Emperor had now passed under the control of a general of the Hindu confederacy, which was swayed by the Minister of the Peshwa-himself the Mayor of the Palace of the Raja of Satara, whose claims were historically based upon a rebellion against Mughal sovereignty." Finally, in 1803, we find Lord Lake again taking under British protection the poor old blind Emperor, Shah Alam, "seated under a small tattered canopy."
With this record of facts before one, how can it possibly be said that the Mughal Empire continued down to 1858 an effective source of political authority? The power of the Mughal Empire disappeared after 1761, and neither dialectics nor legal quibbling can alter that fact. As regards the academic question of de jure suzerainty, we should have thought that to be permanently terminated by the fact that the Emperor, or the troops under his orders, had twice fought the Company in the field and been defeated on both occasions. It can hardly be contended that de jure sovereignty remains with one who, after being defeated in battle and making submission to his conquerors, is granted a subsistence allowance at their will and pleasure.