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on the other', "Acit", observes Srinivasachari, describing Yadava's philosophy, "is the object which can develop into the subject and consciousness sleeps in the matter and wakes up in the sentient being"." Yet, strangely enough Bhaskara emphasises the abheda texts and, consequently, emphasises the ultimacy of identity (ananyatva), in spite of his professed dualism of brahman and upadhis, while Yadava emphasises the eternality of difference, as well as of unity, despite his belief in a kind of pan-spiritualismR.
JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE
Whatever may be the differences existing between Bhaskara and Yadava with respect to certain specific issues, two of which have been just noticed, these two thinkers primarily aim at setting forth a metaphysical scheme in which reality is "neither a bare unity nor a mere plurality-but a vital synthesis of both". But while they have succeeded in considerably weakening the vigour of the Advaitic claims for a pure being, or a 'bare unity', which is bereft of all determinations or diversities, they have not succeeded in escaping the consequences of incongruously endeavouring to rear an imposing structure of diversity (the world and the selves, bheda) on the foundation of unity (brahman or abheda). They credit unity with 'being' the source and the destiny
1. Ibid.
2.
Ibid., p. 145. Also cf. p. 6, f.n. 1, wherein a confirmatory observation, on this point, is cited from Tatparya-dipika of Sudarsanācārya.
3.
On the entire question of this difference between the views of the two thinkers, see ibid., p. 145, IP, Vol. II, pp. 671-672 and Brahmavadin, Vol. V, p. 470.
4. Cf. Hiriyanna's Foreword to Srinivasachari's op. cit., p. VII.
