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CHAPTER III
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diverse world of objects and selves. Upādhis or limitations are conceived by him to be real' (satyopādhis), not fictitious (mithyopādhis). The conditioned state of the unconditioned is compared to an enclosed or limited space in a jar, and the enclosed space is, nevertheless, thought to be continuous with the universal space. This principle of upādhis, which is considered as the necessary condition of the evolution of the world from the unconditioned, or the unlimited, absolute, is brought in by Bhāskara to bridge the gulf between the infinite and unitary absolute and the finite and multitudinous world. Yādava, on the contrary, does not feel the need of postulating anything like upādhis to intervene between the evolving brahman and the evolved world. He is content with investing brahman with an inherent power, or śakti', by virtue of which brahman can finitize itself into the world of diversities just as an ocean can spontaneously break itself into waves, ripples, and foam.
Secondly, Bhāskara and his followers maintain that ‘Brahman has two parts, a spirit part (cidarśa) and a material part (acidarśa)', the latter being a medium through which brahman transforms itself into the finite world'. Yādava, on the contrary, gives his ontology a certain spiritualistic orientation by denying qualitative differences between God (īśvara or brahman) and consciousness (cit) on the one hand, and between consciousness and matter (acit)
1. Cf. Srinivasachari, op. cit., pp. 51, 69-72 and 144. For Rāmā.
nuja's objections against the notion of upādhis, see pp. 214-215.
Ibid., p. 144. 3. Cf. ibid., p. 6.
