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CHAPTER V
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reared on the foundation of anekāntavāda (the doctrine of manifoldness). Deferring an allusion to syādvāda or saptabhangi, nayavāda and anekāntavāda to a later stage, we may now address ourselves to an analysis of the central idea which offers the modus operandi of synthesising identity and difference, being and non-being, or affirmation and negation, as a necessary preliminary to the refutations of the charges made against the Jaina view :
Every entity comprises, within the fullness of its being, two constituent elements, both equally important, viz., what is itself (svatattva) and what is other-than-itself (paratattva). A jar (ghața), for instance, is constituted not merely by all the traits entering into its making, but also by the numerous other traits which constitute entities like a cloth (pața), a fruit (phala) or a book (pustaka), which are not, or are other than, the jar. The former group of traits forms the positive element (sat or vidhi), that is, what the jar is per se, and the latter group the negative element (asat or nişedha), or whatis-not (or what-is-other-than) the jar'. Both the positive and the negative elements constitute the two moments or the two poles of the entity, viz., the jar in the present instance.
If reality is considered on the one hand to be all positive, or merely existent (ekāntabhāvātmake), then everything would be everything else (vaišvarūpań syāt or sarvātmakam syāt). On this hypothesis neither the distinctions among the entities, nor the diverseness of character within the same entity, could be explained: "If a thing had only positive
1. Cf. sarvapadārthānāṁ svarūpeṇa sattvam pararūpeṇa cāsattvam /
TRD, p. 234.
