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JAINA THEORIES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE
buted to the protean evil (dosa) of virodha are said to befall the Jaina theory of reality which is variously described as identity-in-difference (bhedābheda), or being (sat or bhāva) and non-being (asat or abhāva), or affirmation (vidhi) and negation (pratiședha). Broadly speaking, virodhadoșa is at the back of even the four questions under which we have been endeavouring to examine, critically and comprehensively, the ontological implications of the Jaina theory, although it (virodhadosa) has been enumerated as one of the several doșas in this connection, Obviating this principal evil should, therefore, form the most important part of the Jaina defence against the dialectical charges of the opponent schools whether the charges be the four questions—the first two of which come under the present review-or the seven or more dosas centering round, or deriving from, virodha.
There is, in this connection, an important idea which forms the nucleus of almost the entire defensive or refutational as well as of the constructive metaphysical endeavour of the Jainas. It concerns the operative method of combining identity and difference, or being and non-being, or affirmation and negation, into the discriminative synthesis of a real, in which they are necessary, complementary and equal elements. Realization of the vital significance of this idea will reveal it, not merely as a direct answer to the imputation of virodha to the Jaina view, but also as a key to a fuller understanding and appreciation of the comprehensive metaphysical edifice represented by the twofold superstructure of nayavāda (the theory of standpoints) and syādvāda (the dialectic of relativism) or saptabhangi (the theory of sevenfold predication) which in turn are