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XXVIII
with the same substance. Thereforê existence can be affirmed of the ghata when we have the black colour in view. But non-existence can be asserted of it when any other colour is in view. Thus existence and non-existence can be predicated of the ghata from two different points of view, though these are mutually exclusive qualities. As with the colour, so with the place, the manufacturer, the instrument and the implements with which it is made, &c. We can form many pairs of such contradictory 'qualities that can be predicated of the ghata only when we consider it from different points of view and the apparent contradiction can thus be removed.
This is sufficient to explain the fact that an insigni-. ficant object like ghata requires, if it is to be fully understood, consideration from so many standpoints. The difficulty. is manifestly greater when the object of thought is Universe, Mukti and the like. But the main fact remains that complete knowledge is that which views the object. under consi. deration from all possible standpoints. It is a principle which cannot be too much emphasised. The whole of Jaina logic is centred round it. This principle is therein called Syādvāda or Anekāntavāda. It distinguishes Jainism from all other religions and philosophies. • Every religion tries to teach the nian to go beyond the phenomenon. Jainism does the same thing. But Jainism differs from all other religions on one vital point. All other religions cognise the real but from a restricted view-point. Therein cognition refers to a limited part of the cognised. Thus for şnstance when the Chārvākas say that everything is liable to destruction, they utter only half truth. From the phenomenal point of view, nothing indeed is permanent but from the nonplenomenal point of view it is not so. This latter aspect the Chārvākas fail to take into account and hence their theory is onesided and therefore mistaken. These remarks apply to other religions and philosophies also. Nothing in itself is