Yatindrasuri Diksha Shatabdi Samrak Granth

SR No.: 012036
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Jinprabhvijay
Publisher: Saudharmbruhat Tapagacchiya Shwetambar Shree Sangh
Publication Year: 1997
Total Pages: 1228
Language: Hindi, English, Gujarati
Classification: Smruti_Granth & Articles
File Size: 68 MB

Page 1153

-YATEENDRASURI SMARAK GRANTH we do not mean that the Lord Mahavira is to attain
The fallacy of this naya occurs when we conor attaining nirvana on the day we actually sosider the general property alone as constituting a spoke. The event took place many centuries ago thing. This kind of fallacious propositions gives rise on a corresopnding day of that year. Because of to confusion of thought, because the general qualithis correspondence an event true of the day cen- ties alone can never constitute an actual object. turies ago is also associated with all such corre
(3) Vyavahara : This Naya means the popusponding days of the subsequent years. In the
lar and conventional point of view, which rests on Bhuta naigama instead of looking back to the past
sense-parception of the concrete present. The conwe may look forward to a remote future, instead of
crete reality of things is sufficient for our practical detecting in the concrete present the continuity of
life. It amounts to knowing things by the Co the past, we may discover in it something which is
value. It takes into consideration a general oot yet to be. As for example, when on perceiving
as possessing specific properties. It does not deal would be king we say, "Here comes His Royal High- with generality as does the sangraha nava. On ness.' It means that he is not yet king now, but is the other hand it classifies the subject matter of going to be one soon. Similarly we may speak of the sangraha in the mode of particularity. Examievery Bhavyajive a good soul as siddhajiva, a per nation of the specific Dravyas. Jiva Dravya and fect soul. For somehow in the far off future perfec- Ajiva Dravya, both belonging to the Dravya Genus. tion will be the goal of all; for everyone is God in whould be an illustration of the vyavahara naya. the germ. Such an assertion is true according to
Fallacy of Vyavahara Naya lies in wrong se. Bhavanaigam or future Naigam.
lection of species. When the generic correlative of (2) Samaraha : This standpoint is that which specific feature is entirely ignored the resultant comprehends several different modes under one
fallacy comes to have only the semblance of this common head through their belonging to the same
naya. Which select, only four primary elements as class. In other words, it deals with the general char
real, is the best example of this naya. This type of acteristic of an object or the class character of a
fallacy is found in the Indian philosophy. factual situation. As for example, 'reality is one (4) Rjusutra : The argument underlying this because it exists' is prossition of this naya. It does
standpoint is that of immediate utility which natunot look at the particular properties of reality but rally must be grounded upon the present aspect of regards the general property as its subject matter a thing. It denies all continuity and identity. It is though there can be no general or universal with- purely momentary. It is important to note here that out particular, yet the enquiring from this stand- it does not refer to the past or future of the thing. In point keeps in view the generic qualities only. this respect it is still narrower than the vyavanaric
present. At least for vyavaharic view there is a tolThis naya is of two kinds, para-sangraha
erable duration; for the present and the conven(ultimiate class-view) and Apara Sangraha (infe
tional things are real so far. But according to this rior class-view). Every existing thing partakes of
naya a thing is what it is in the present mathematithe nature of reality. Hence we may speak of all
cal moment. To speak of duration of a thing is rethings as one in the ultimate Reality and it is the
jected by this view as an unwarrented assumpexample of Parasangraha naya. But the different tion. Thus it enables to secure the balance between classes of things living and non-living included in change and permanence. Accordingly when we this ultimate Reality may themselves be spoken claim to know a thing; we mean thereby to know it of as different classes and it is the subject matter only with reference to its present substantive state of the Apara-sangraha naya.
(Dravya) name (Nama) and form. For example, we