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CHAPTER VI. THE JAIN THEORY OF FORMAL LOGIC. Meeting the Charvakas on their own grounds.Refutation of their hypothesis and Demonstration of the legitimacy of Inferential-knowledge-The Jain Theory of Formal Logic and definitions of “Pratyaksha". --- **Paroksha" includes Inference and Testimony-Definition of Inference and Forms of Syllogisms - Testimony or the Word - Definition of Praman or Valid knowledge-- the World of Reals and not of Phantoms as hold the Buddhists.
So we see how in addition to Direct Perception (TER JAIT), Inference (agaia )
Prima facie is also admissible as an Indirect means
Objection
against the ( परोक्ष प्रमाण ) according to the Jain
interpretion of the Jain
Pramânas. epistemology But then the Purva Pakshin, Chårvåk, will, indeed, remark that our classification of the means of knowledge
-Pramånas and our definition and interpretation of the logical terms-Pratyaksha and Paroksha—are in clear contravention to the common acceptation and interpretation of the same and as such should be rejected ; for where is the person so insane as to accept this our view, the import and uses of the logical vocabularies of which, are
