________________
Syadvuda
61
nature it may be such that it cannot be casily described. As Prof. Mukerjec says, this predication gives a fuller and a more comprehensive picture of the thing than the earlier ones. The prodicated attribute is a synthesis of the three attributes; still, it is not a mere summation of the attributes. It brings out the inexpressibility of a thing as well as what it is and what it is oot.
Affirmation and negation and inexpressibility are the three fundamental predications. This implies that all negation has a positive basis. Even imaginary concepts like the sky-flower possess a positive basis in the two reals, the sky and flower, although the combination is unreal. All things which are objects of thought are in one sense, and are not in another sense.
The doctrine of Syadvada has been subjected to severe criticism by eminent phdosophers from Samkarācārya and Rámánujācarya to the modern philosophers. We may mention a few of them here:
1) It is said that the theory of sevenfold predication can only be the cause of doubt and not of certainty, the assertion of contradictory predicates imples that the present predicating is in doubt, Belvalkar says that Syadvada is sceptical and non-committal in its attitude. With this agostic and negative attitude one can not have any dogma, and Samkarācārya lays his finger accurately on the weakest poiut in the system when be says-"As thus the means of knowledge, the knowing subject, and the act of knowledge, are all alike, indefinite, how can the Tirthaikara (Jina) teach with any claim to authority, and how can his followers act on a doctrine the matter of which is altogether indeterminate ?'183 Prof. Hiriyanna makes Syadvada a variety of scepticism. If all our knowledge concerning reality is relative, they say (the old Indian critics like Samkara,
133. The undercurrents of Jainism (An article in the Indian Philosophical
Review Vol. I No. 1 1947 edited by A. C, Widgeny and R. D. Kanade. Bombay). pp. 33.