Anekantajay patakakhyam Prakaranam Part 2

SR No.: 008406
Original Sutra Author: Haribhadrasuri
Author: Munichandrasuri
Publisher: Oriental Research Institute Vadodra
Publication Year: 1947
Total Pages: 503
Language: Sanskrit, English
Classification: Book_Devnagari & Philosophy
File Size: 11 MB

Page 403

[P. 33, ll. 5-10
P. 33, II. 5-10. All these three verses with slight variations or without them are quoted in TRD (p. 78a), Bodhicaryavatarapañjikā (p. 492), Nyayarinis'cayavivarana (p. 581a) and Nyāyakumudacandra (pp. 838-839). In the fn. of the last work explanation from Manoratha nandini is given.
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NOTES
P. 33, 1. 11 & p. 34, 1. 3 & l. 8-10. In Syadvadaratnākara (p. 1118) and in Nyāyakumudacandra (p. 841) we find all these lines as quotations and in TRD (p. 78a) all except the last; but, nowhere the original source is mentioned or traced.
P. 34, I. 16.
sro occurs on p. 29, 11. 5-6.
P. 36, 1. 3. This is the commencement of the refutation of the first Issue-allegation.
P. 36, 1. 4. aitasirakats' means well-known to cow-herds, women and others. On p. 78, 1. 6 we have art. It is explained in 11. 18-19 as of i. e. well-known to the whole world. Literally it means well-known from the learned to women, women here standing for illiterate! For a similar phrase see p. 175, 1.5; p. 215, 11. 10-11; p. 227, 11. 6-7; p. 282, 1. 5; p. 339, 1. 8; p. 397, 1. 6; II-p. 48, 1. 8; p. 59, 1. 23; p. 75, 1. 8; p. 85, 1. 10; p. 111, 1, 9; and p. 125, 11, 11-12.
P. 36, II. 5-12. A thing exists in view of its own dravya (substance), ksetra (place), kala (time) and bhava (nature or property); but it does not exist in view of the substance etc. of another object. Thus a thing is in its own substance etc., but not in another substance etc. If we deny the latter as the Bauddhas do, it will be every thing; for, it will not be asut in any way.
Similarly a thing is asut i. e. non-existence' is predicated of a thing, in view of the substance etc. of another thing but not so, as regards its own substance etc. Otherwise it will have no existence like the horns of an ass i. e. to say it will be thorough nihilism.
Thus, in order that (i) a thing may not lose its individuality-its own self and (ii) its own nature may not become nothing, it is desirable to believe that a thing exists and does not exist as well, though, from different view-points--in different capacities such as eva-dravya and para-dravya. In short, the Jainus believe in being-cum-non-being of all things from different points of view, viz. and . For details see JRL (Ch. XII).
P. 37, 11. 7-11. Any and every thing has its own substance, place, time and nature. Further, it will not do to think of a thing as having only any one or more of them and not all of them. Thus we cannot think of
FL
jar with reference to its substance (say clay) only, while totally ignoring --denying its place, time and nature, which, too, inhere in it.
I This non-existence belongs to the thing itself and not to the other thing, and that, too, as regards the substance etc. of the other thing. In short, X is X only and not non-X.