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PADMANABH S. FAINI
Question: A distinction between souls exists on account of their karma, as for instance, between a human being and an animal or a being in hell. But you maintain that the distinction between a bhavya and an abhavya is not caused by karma. When the soulness (jivatva) is common to all, why make any distinction (between a bhavya and an abhavya)".
Answer: This is not a valid objection. The soul (jīva) and the space (ākāśa), for instance, share several common properties, e.g., 'substanceness' (dravyatva), 'objectness' (prameyatva), etc., yet there are innate differences between the two. The ākaša, for instance, is devoid of consciousness (cartanya), whereas the jīva has it as its very nature. The same is true of the bhavya and the abhavya. Soulness (îvatva) is their common property, yet there is an innate difference between them.2
Question: According to you bhavyatva is an innate disposition like jīvatva. Being innate it must also be eternal. But unless the bhavyatva (capacity for release) is terminated there can be no emancipation, since the liberated soul (siddha) cannot be said to be a bhavya (capable of release) or an abhavya. How can you terminate that which is innate to a soul?3
Answer: This too is not a valid objection. Although beginningless, the antecedent non-existence (prāg-abhāva) of a jar comes to an end with the coming into existence of the jar. Similarly, bhavyatva is terminated by some proper means (such as faith, knowledge and conduct) together with the attainment of mokşa.4
Question: If all bhavyas attain mokșa won’t there come a time when the world like the decreasing hoard of a granaryis emptied of all bhavyas and will consist of only the abhavya souls 25
1.
Ibid., 1821 cd-1822 Ibid, 1823. Ibid., 1824 with Vivarana 1824 Ibid., 1825 Ibid, 1827 ab. Vivarana 1827 ab
4 5.
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