Tattva Sangraha Vol 2

SR No.: 007609
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Kamlashila, Ganganatha Jha
Publisher: Oriental Research Institute Vadodra
Publication Year: 1939
Total Pages: 887
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 84 MB

Page 91

816
TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XIX.
adding the term 'and the rest in the phrase 'negation of Perception and the rest.
Further, if the cognition of a thing other than that were definite and certain,--then it must be admitted that it proves the absence of the counterentity. Otherwise, if the Negation were proved as merely existing, then it would mean that the negation in question has become cognised by all men, through the said 'cognition of the other thing' appearing in any one person only. In that case, how could the Mimāmsaka, who regards Cognition as imperceptible, become cognisent of that Cognition of another thing'1—He would never be able to cognise it.
If through Presumption'-'if it is cognised'-this has to be construed here, from the context; -as has been asserted in the statement- As there can be no idea of the object that is not cognised, the cognition of the thing is inferred from the inferential indicative in the shape of the Idea of the thing';-here the term 'inferential indicative' stands for Presumption ;and cognition of the thing' means that cognition which can be explained otherwise than on the basis of the said Presumption ;- inferred stands for definitely cognised.
In that case, as this Presumption also would be a Cognition, it has to be explained how it is itself cognised.
If the answer be that "it is cognised through another Presumption ", - then, there would be an infinito regress.
Then again, if the idea of Negation being an entity is admitted, then, just as the 'negation of the Means of Cognition' is an entity, the 'negation of the object cognised' also should be an entity; and in that case, being an entity, why cannot Negation bo regarded as cognised through Percoption itself? In that case there would be no need for postulating a distinct Means of Cognition for the Cognition of Negation.-(1667-1670)
The following Text supports the same idea of Negation being included under Perception :
TEXT (1871).
THE NEGATION OF THE EFFECT' CONSISTS IN THE PRESENCE OF THE CAUSE ; AND THIS LATTER IS OF A NATURE DISTINCT FROM THE OTHER, AND IS APPREHENDED BY PERCEPTION
ITSELF.-(1671)
COMMENTARY.
It has been declared (by Kumarila himself, see Text 1655 above) that The Negation of the effect consists in the presence of the Cause'; and this presence of the Cause'is of a nature-character distinct from the Effect; and it is apprehended by Perception itself; so that what other aspect of
Negation' is left to be cognised, for the sake of which Negation would be a distinct Means of Cognition :