Tattva Sangraha Vol 2

SR No.: 007609
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Kamlashila, Ganganatha Jha
Publisher: Oriental Research Institute Vadodra
Publication Year: 1939
Total Pages: 887
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 84 MB

Page 90

OTHER FORMS AND MEANS OF KNOWLEDGE.
815
TEXT (1666). “WHAT IS COGNISED THROUGH THE SAID COGNITION OF SOME OTHER THING, IN THE SHAPE OF THE PLACE DEVOID OF THE THING IN QUESTION, IS THE NON-EXISTENCE OF ONLY THAT WHICH IS AS CAPABLE OF BEING COGNISED AS THE OTHER THING COGNISED, WHEN OTHER CAUSES ARE PRESENT " - IF THIS IS WHAT IS MEANT (THEN THE ANSWER IS AS IN THE
FOLLOWING Text]. — (1666)
COMMENTARY.
The following might be urged "What we mean to prove is not the non-existence of all that is not perceived; it is the non-existence of only that which is as capable of being cognised as the place devoid of the Jar and other things,-i.e. that only which would be perceptible if it were there.
Through the cognition of some other thing', -i.e, on the cognition of the place devoid of the Jar and other things."-(1666)
The answer to the above is as follows:
TEXTS (1667-1670). [UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES) THE NON-EXISTENCE SHOULD BE SAID
TO BE OF ONLY THAT PERCEPTION WHICH ENVISAGES THE PERCEPTIBLE OBJECT,NOT OF OTHERS; AS THAT WOULD BE FALSE. HOW TOO IS IT KNOWN THAT the cognition of the other thing HAS COME ABOUT, WHEN COGNITIONS THEMSELVES ARE NOT PERCEPTIBLE ? IF IT IS KNOWN THROUGH PRESUMPTION, THAT TOO IS OF THE NATURE OF COGNITION, HOW THEN IS IT ITSELF COGNISED? IF ANOTHER PRESUMPTION IS SUGGESTED, THEN THERE IS AN INFINITE REGRESS.IF THE NEGATION OF COGNITION IS AN ENTITY, THE NEGATION OF THE COGNISED OBJECT' ALSO SHOULD BE THE SAME. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHY DO YOU NOT INCLUDE NEGATION UNDER PERCEPTION ITSELF 1-(1667-1670)
COMMENTARY.
Shalyadarshana' is that thing the Perception of which is possible, i.e. what is perceptible. 'Ābha' is form, figure ;-hence what is meant is that Perception which envisages the perceptible thing,
Not of others-i.e. of Inference and the rest; because what is cognised through these is imperceptible; and the absence of these is not followed by the absence or negation of things removed in time, place and naturo; so that the absence or negation of these would be false (if brought forward as bringing about the Negation of these things). Hence there would be no sense in