________________
784
TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XIX.
TEXTS (1588-1589).
" FOR EXAMPLE(1) THE ASSUMPTION OF THE BURNING POWER OF FIRE,
BASED UPON THE perceived FACT OF ITS HAVING BURNT A CERTAIN THING :-(2) THE ASSUMPTION OF THE mobility OF THE SUN BASED UPON THE inferred FACT OF ITS GOING FROM PLACE TO PLACE.-[Shlokavärtika-PRESUMPTION, 3]:-(3) THE POTENCIES OF ALL THINGS ARE PRESUMED ON THE BASIS OF THE INEXPLICABILITY OF THE EFFECTS PRODUCED BY THEM: I Shlokavärtila-SHÜNYA, 254]: AND ALL SUCH POTENCIES THAT BECOME COGNISED ARE SUCH AS HAVE NOT BEEN KNOWN ALREADY,-AND THESE ARE COGNISED WITHOUT ANY IDEA OF THE RELATION (OF CONCOMITANCE)."(1588-1589)
COMMENTARY.
(1) An example of Presumption based upon Perception is the followingHaving perceived the fact of burning by Fire, there is Presumption of the prosence of Burning Power of Fire.
(2) An example of Presumption based upon Inference is the followingWhen the fact of the Sun's moving from place to place has been inferred, this leads to the Presumption of the presence of mobility in the Sun.
(3) The potencies of all things are always presumed on the basis of the inexplicability otherwise of the effects produced by them. This Presumption (of Potoncies) itself is based sometimes on Perception; e.g. when one perceives the effect and thonce presumes the potency in the Causo; -when however the effect is known through Inference or some other moans of Cognition, and thence the Potency of the Cause is presumed, then the Presumption is based upon Inferenoo or some other Means of Cognition.
The compound Käryõrthāpatti, etc.' is to be expounded as those whose cognition is brought about by the otherwise inexplicability of the effect (i.e. the fact that the effect cannot be explained except on the basis of the Potencies).
It cannot be said that the Potency of the Cause is already known; because the said Potencies that are cognised are always such as are not already known ; so that the cognition does not apprehend what has been already apprehended; and hence this must be regarded as a form of Valid Cognition.
It might bo argued that-'Potencies are always inferred from the effects, --they are not presumed'.
The answer to this is that the cognitions in question are brought about without any idea of the relation of Concomitance, necessary in all Inference); hence they cannot be regarded as Inference.-(1588-1689)
The following text proceeds to show the said absence of any idea of the Relation -