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OTHER FORMS AND MEANS OF KNOWLEDGE.
775
This is exactly the same idea (that has been set forth in the Nyāyasūtra quoted above).-(1563)
The above view of Analogical Cognition is refuted in the following
TEXTS (1564-1565). IF THE PERFECT IDEA OF THE relation to the Name IS THERE AT THE TIME
OF THE HEARING OF THE ANALOGICAL STATEMENT -THEN THE RESULTANT ANALOGICAL COGNITION APPREHENDS WHAT HAS BEEN ALREADY APPREHENDED; AND AS SUCH, IT CANNOT HAVE THE CHARACTER OF A Means of Valid Cognition ; BECAUSE, LIKE REMEMBRANCE, THIS ANALOGY ALSO IS DEVOID OF THE TRUE CHARACTER OF THE INSTRUMENT' (AND Pramāna IS AN INSTRUMENT, A MEANS, OF COGNITION).-(1564-1565)
COMMENTARY. At the time that the statement of analogy is heard, the idea of the relation of Name and Named is already there if the same idea appears again subsequently, it apprehends what has been already apprehended before, and hence-like Remembrance--cannot be a valid cognition.
It might be urged that "It may apprehend what is already apprehended, and yet it may be a Means of valid cognition ; what would be the incongruity in that ?"
The answer to this is- It is devoid of, etc. etc. That is, the true character of Instrument consists in being the most effective cause,--and a cause is most effective only when it tends to bring about what has not been already brought about.-(1564-1565)
The following might be urged." There has been no previous idea of the relation of the Name at all; hence the Reason because it apprehends what is already apprehended' is not admissible". Answer :
TEXT (1566). IF THE IDEA HAS NOT BEEN THERE, THEN, HOW IS IT THAT THE MAN HAS THE NOTION THAT THIS IS THE OBJECT whose
Name I HAD HEARD BEFORE'?-(1566)
COMMENTARY. If the cognition of the relation of the Name had not been there, then there could have been no such cognition, later on, as that this is the Gavaya whose name I had heard before! (1566)
A further argument to the same effect is stated :