________________
c. f. Reld, Hamilton, Mill and Comte.
Inference
AN EPITOME OF JAINISM. or internal perception. For mind has no para perception except through the senses and om therefore external. It is interesting to
compare the Charvâkas with Reid and Hamilton, who on the one hand deny the possibility of internal intuition of universal truths, and Mill and Comte on the other hand who reject all 'Introspective knowledge' as ever possible.
(c) Then again, "Inference," says the Indian materialist, "cannot give it ; for
Inference ( ga1a) itself always requires cannot give, universal proposition affirming the connec
tion between the major and the middle as universally true." For example when we say that a man is mortal : Socrates is a man and therefore mortal, we are assuming a necessary connection between humanity and mortality. But the possibility of such a connection, at least of our knowing such a connection, even if it existed, is just what we require to prove. Thus we can see that mere Inference cannot prove it ; for it is only assumed. To say that the connection, though assumed yet makes inference possible is to argue in a circle. And hence we cannot
assumed
50
