New Dimensions in Jaina Logic

SR No.: 007010
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Mahaprajna Acharya, Nathmal Tatia
Publisher: Today and Tommorrow Printers and Publishers
Publication Year: 1984
Total Pages: 206
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 10 MB

Page 127

Inference
119
The conception of knowledge as for oneself or for others is old, but the division of inference into two similar categories is borrowed from the Nyāya and the Buddhist school. Acarya Siddhasena has considered the perceptual cognition (pratyaksa) also, like inference, as made for others. He says: 'Perception as well as inference serve to communicate one's knowledge of a fact to others being the necessary means (of the emergence of such knowledge in their minds). And so both of them should be regarded as serving the purpose of other persons.'? Vadidevasūri has also followed this view of Siddhasena. The linguistic expression of a fact, whether it is a case of inference or that of perception (pratyaksa), is necessarily made for others. The subjective inference (svārthänumāna) consists in the knowledge of the probandum by means of the probans. For instance, a person perceives smoke and infers the existence of fire at a remote place. In such knowledge there is no formal need of the statement of the subject and the citation of an example. A syllogistic inference (parārthanumâna, that is, made for others) requires the explicit statement of the subject, and the probans for convincing others. For instance, a person asks another person to look for fire on the other bank of the river by pointing out the presence of smoke there. As a consequence the subjective inference of fire arises in the mind of the listener. An organ of knowledge (pramāņa) is essentially of the nature of knowledge, whereas the syllogistic inference, made for others, is only a linguistic medium and as such it is not, truly speaking, an organ of knowledge (pramāna) but it may be called so metaphorically. The syllogistic inference produces a subjective inference in the mind of the listener, and so metaphorically the former is called an organ of knowledge qua the producer of the latter.
In Nyāya philosophy inference is given as of three types, viz. pūrvavat (from cause to effect), sesavat (from effect to cause) and sāmānyatodrsta (usually observed).
in the Sāmkhya System as well as in Caraka’ also these three types are mentioned. Āryarakṣitasüri has accepted these three with a slight change in the type called sāmānyatodrsta which is changed by him as drstasādharmyavat.* This classification practically lost importance with the development of the Buddhist logic. *
* The discussion moves on to the three kinds of inference distinguished in the Sütras. (1) Pūrvavat. There is a lengthy discussion as to whether this means inference from cause to effect or from effect to cause. Jayanta and Kumārila agree that the former is correct. (2) Seşavat. The discussion here follows familiar lines. (3)