New Dimensions in Jaina Logic

SR No.: 007010
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Mahaprajna Acharya, Nathmal Tatia
Publisher: Today and Tommorrow Printers and Publishers
Publication Year: 1984
Total Pages: 206
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 10 MB

Page 126

VII
7. Inference
Inference is an important topic of the science of logic. Its jurisdiction is very extensive. It is on the basis of inference that the science of reasoning or rational investigation is developed. The expression anumāna, which stands for inference, is composed of two words, viz. anu and māna, and it literally means knowledge (māna) that is consequent upon (anu) perception. According to the tradition of Jaina āgamas it is the verbal testimony (śruta) that follows in the wake of perception (mati)-maipuvvayam suyam. In the Nyāya system also anumana (inference) is considered as resulting from perceptual conditions.
Inference has two limbs, viz. the probans (sādhana) and the probandum (sādhya). The probans is directly perceived whereas the probandum is cognised indirectly (through the probans). We perceive the probans at the outset and then remember the universal concomitance (vyāpti) which is followed by the inference of the probandum.
Inference is of two kinds, viz. (1) subjective (that is, for one's ownself) and (2) syllogistic (that is, for others). In the Jaina tradition the entire domain of knowledge is divided into two categories, viz. (1) those that are for one's own self, and (2) those that are for others. In the Sūtrakrtānga two sources of knowledge have been distinguished, viz. (1) by oneself (ātmatah), and (2) through other means (parataḥ). The self's knowledge is knowledge for oneself and the verbal knowledge (or propositions) is for others. The four categories of knowledge, viz. perception (mati), clairvoyance (avadhi), mind reading (manahparyava) and omniscience (kevalajhana) are for oneself, while the verbal knowledge (śruta) is for self as well as for others. In fact, knowledge per se is never for others, but it is made to serve the purpose of others by expressing it through language. There is no relation of identity or causality between knowledge and language. Language is the conveyor of one's knowledge to others and so metaphorically the former is identified with the latter which is consequently treated as made for others. In fact, it is the language that is made for others and not knowledge.