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ahimseti"l). This definition of ahimsā has its own significance but this is not the type of definition required by the socioethical consciousness of mankind. This definition makes social values like devotion to the teacher, devoted service of the country etc. as exclusive of ahimsā. It is a deeply inner oriented definition, which though spiritually valuable yet ethically not of much significance. The same thing can be said of the definition, ‘Apramatta is ahimsaka' (^Appamatto ahissago’12) because apramatta again is said to be the nonemergence of attachment etc. To adopt the above definition of ahimsā is tantamount to living in the realm of mysticism, which does not concern us here. Our enquiry in ethics is concerned with the pursuit of śubha (good) and avoidance of aśubha (bad).
After dealing with the question, what is śubha or good? we now propose to discuss, what is the good or the śubha according to the Jinist? In other words, the question now confronts us is : What kinds of things are intrinsically good according to the Jinist. This means that there are ends which are to be desired for their own sake. The Jinist does not subscribe to the view recognised by Dewey that there are no ends intrinsically good or worthwhile in themselves. The Jinist view is that not all things are instrumentally good : there are goods which are final and intrinsic and should be pursued for the goods themselves.'
This brings us to the distinction between good as a means and good in itself. What I wish to say is this : the question what is the goodi.e. what things are good comprises two things namely (1) good as a means, and (2) good in itself.'? But the definition that "Good is an experience in tune with ahiṁsā is applicable to both. “Whenever we judge that a thing is good as a means, we judge both that it will have a
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Spiritual Awakening (Samyagdarśana) and Other Essays
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