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છL ઉપાધ્યાય યશોવિજય સ્વાધ્યાય ગ્રંથ
In fact, positive and negative aspects must both belong to everything. If only the positive aspects belong to it there would be nothing to distinguish it from another and all things would become 'Sat'. If instead, only the negative aspects belong to a thing, it would have no intrinsic value.' So, production, destruction and permanence is the nature of Reality and this many-sided characteristic of reality is the basis of Anekāntavāda. ?5
Anekāntavāda combines all view-points and this is the only way to know the real nature of a thing. By saying Anekānta is real method we are not emphasizing Anekāntavāda in the form of Anekānta, because, in this, on the basis of context and intention of the speakers particular view-point becomes dominant and other view-point becomes subordinate. Anekānta is not a single doctrine.it is a combination of many Nayas and does not uphold particular view-point. Thus, it cannot be said that, it is also ekāntavāda. This is a doctrine of reconciliation and acceptable to almost all the systems of Indian philosophy. It harmonises all the conflicting views and sees unity in diversity.
Yaśovijaya beautifully describes how, no system of Indian philosophy can reject Anekāntavāda. Sankhya system cannot reject Anekāntavāda because, it upholds the view that mutually contradictory attributes can exist in one and the same thing by stating that Prakrti consists of Sattva. Raias and Tamas. Anekāntvāda is not unacceptable to vijnanavādi Buddhist because, he claims that Vijnana is one but takes different forms. That means Vijnana is one and many. Again, Naiyāyikas cannot reject Anekānta because according to them though conglomeration of several mutually exclusive rūpas belong to a single substance (citrarūpa), and its knowledge is authentic, it is one and many. In other words, according to Nyāya-Vaiseșikas Citrarūpas can exist in one and the same substance. Prabhākara Mimāmsakas will not object because they hold that though knowledge is one, still indirect knowledge is different from direct knowledge. Kumārila Bhatta, who claims that reality is both universal and particular, identity-cum-difference, upholds the Anekāntavāda. Even Advaita Vedāntins cannot refute Anekānta because for them Atman is bound as well as unbound. From the phenomenal point of view, Atman is bound and Atman is unbound, ever free, from the transcendental point of view. The