Vratya Darshan

SR No.: 003131
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Mangalpragyashreeji Samni
Publisher: Adarsh Sahitya Sangh
Publication Year: 2000
Total Pages: 262
Language: Sanskrit
Classification: Book_Devnagari & Philosophy
File Size: 10 MB

Page 253

the Vāiseşikās one and the same thing is not both permanent and transitory or Being and Becoming. The Jains, on the other hand, accept identity-cum-difference between both of them. According to the Jain philosophy, a substance is the co-existence of both the Being and Becoming, the unwavering and the wavering, the stable and unstable. It is immutable and mutable both. The soul is immutable and as such it never changes into non-soul. It is also mutable and as such it passes through various modes. This is true not only of the soul but of all other substances which are neither absolutely permanent nor absolutely impermanent, but both permanent and impermanent simultaneously.
All that originates, vanishes and persists is real. This triple criterion of truth is as validly applicable to the material atom as to the spiritual self. Each and every existent comes under this criterion. According to Jain philosophy existence is a combination of both, absolute and relative, stable and unstable. We find this truth in Bhagavati sūtra in these words.
It is true, O Lord !, asked Gautama, that the unstable changes while the stable does not change, the unstable breaks whereas the stable does not break? yes, Gautama !'This is exactly so"
This statement of Bhagavati indicates the nature of existence. The stable is permanent and unstable is origination and cessation. It means that existence has dual nature. Which, though opposite to each other, coexist as complimentary to each other. Resolving the Contradiction
The question before the Jains was as to how can they attribute two contradictory characteristics to existence simultaneously. The Jains resolve the problem by pointing out that we attribute certain characteristics of any object because we give prominence to those characteristics; it does not mean that the opposite characteristics are being denied. The fact is that when we predicate some attributes to some objects, we also imply the possibility of the opposite characteristic as well.
२३४ . व्रात्य दर्शन