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are ubiquitous. Jayanta as a Naiyāyika fully believing in the reality of objects implied by words can hardly give his consent to it. He, therefore, rejects it as a mere dogmatic statement.
7. Jayanta argues that it is admitted on all hands that the knowledge of the relationship between a word and an import is required for purposes of the cognition of a sense from a word. But, if the Grammarian maintains that a word is expressive of an import through a power innate to it, we do not see any useful purpose to be served by positing the knowledge of the relationship described above. And, if it is posited at all, the reality of import must be admitted. But, the Grammarian does not acknowledge such a reality, for in his opinion what is signified by word is mere appearance of it, which is the only real principle.
• We have seen above how Jayanta exposes the hollowness of the Grammarian's doctrine of transformation of word into the worldly objects. But, we would surely be accused of doing injustice to him if we do not study in detail the various other objections which he advances to deal a most staggering blow to the favourite doctrine of his opponents. He continues to write that the doctrine fails to impress him for the simple reason that the fact of superimposition on which it is based cannot be logically proved. Thus, he opines that superimposition can occur under two circumstances : similarity (sadrsya) and contraction (anurāga). The mother-o'-pearl is the locus of superimposition for a piece of silver in which case there is similarity between the two. Again, there may be a case of superimposition when the crystal contracts the reddish glow from a crimson flower beside it. But, neither of the two instances cited above will apply to the case of