Jaina Theory of Multiple Facets of Reality and Truth

SR No.: 001746
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Nagin J Shah
Publisher: B L Institute of Indology
Publication Year: 2000
Total Pages: 168
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, & Nyay
File Size: 12 MB

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Jaina Theory of Multiple Facets of Reality and Truth but only what must be thought, what is objective in this sense. The same logic is sometimes expressed by saying that a determinate existent A is in one respect and is not in another respect. This does not simply mean that A is A and is not B: it means that existent A, as existence universal, is distinct from its particularity.
27. The determinate existent is, in the sense explained, being and negation as distinguishably together, together by what the Jaina calls kramārpana. The given indefinite—the 'unspeakable' or avaktavya as it has been called—as distinct from the definite existent, presents something other than this 'consecutive togetherness': it implies sahārpana or co-presentation which amounts to non-distinction or indeterminate distinction of being and negation in the above sense. It is objective as given: it cannot be said to be not a particular position nor to be nonexistent. At the same time it is not the definite distinction of position and existence; it represents a category by itself. The common-sense principle implied in its recognition is that what is given cannot be rejected simply because it is not expressible by a single positive concept. A truth has to be admitted if it cannot be got rid of even if it is not understood.
28. So far then we have obtained four modes of truth-being, negation, their distinction and their non-distinction—all implied by the distinction between the definite given and the indefinite given. Now this distinction is itself a mode of truth: and as the definite given is taken to be being and negation or particularity and existence together, the indefinite may be considered as together with or distinct from each of these elements taken singly. It may be taken to be a particular i.e., to be together with position, and it may be taken to be many undistinguishable negations, to be the universal-existenceas itself a confusion of the negations of many particulars, as not-A, not-B, not-C.... indefinitely together. Thus we have altogether seven modes of truth-bhangas as they have been called- viz., particular position or being, its negation or the universal-existence, position and negation as distinguishably together or the determinate existent, these as indistinguishably together or the indefinite, this indefinite as itself a being or particular position, as many negations together, and finally as distinct from the determinate existent. If there be an