Jaina Theory of Multiple Facets of Reality and Truth

SR No.: 001746
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Nagin J Shah
Publisher: B L Institute of Indology
Publication Year: 2000
Total Pages: 168
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, & Nyay
File Size: 12 MB

Page 47

The Jaina Theory of Anekānta
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alternation: particularity and thinghood are in each relation without being in the other relation at the same time. Identity is distinct from distinction and yet implies it, i.e., is in alternation with it. There are thus three basal categories-viz., distinction, distinction from distinction as other than distinction, and the indetermination of the two. Ordinary realism is based on the first category; there are forms of realism that admit some kind of definite identity as distinct from distinction; and finally, Jaina realism admits both in the form of indetermination, the identity being interpreted as indefinite.
25. The Jaina develops this category of indetermination into seven alternative modes of truth. The indetermination is ultimately of the definite and indefinite. Now, this yields two relations- definite distinction between them and indefinite distinction. But indefinite distinction between them is to our knowledge nothing other than the indefinite as a term of it: we do not know more of the indefinite than that it is indefinite. The most complex mode of truth then that we know is the definite distinction between the definite and the indefinite, or as we put it more explicitly, between the definite-definite and the definite-indefinite. Every other aspect of truth, as we shall see presently, is implied by it as distinct from and alternative with it.
26. Now the definiteness of the given indefinite, as has been shown already, though objective, sits lightly on the indefinite and is a detachable adjective. The conception of detachable definiteness being thus obtained, the given definite turns out to be a manifold, to be a togetherness or distinction of two definites—the detachable definite, on the one hand, or particular position which has no reference to existence or non-existence, and given-ness or existence in general, on the other, which as contrasted with the particular i.e., as characterless may be called its negation. No other negation is admitted by the Jaina to be objective: what is called absolute negation-one form of which is the contradictory—the negation of what it is not possible to affirm at all is to be rejected as not objective, as no truth at all. The definite-definite or the determinate existent may then be said both to be and not to be: particularity or pure position is its being and existence in general is its negation. There is no contradiction if we bear in mind that the being of pure position is not given existence