Concept of Matter in Jaina Philosophy

SR No.: 001663
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: J C Sikdar
Publisher: P V Research Institute Varanasi
Publication Year: 1987
Total Pages: 412
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, & Physics
File Size: 23 MB

Page 232

Effects of Matter
minor limbs, particles of matter transformed into mind assist the living beings tending to examination of good and evil, remembering things, etc. Hence the physical mind also is material. It is contended by others that mind is a different substance that it is bereft of colour (form), etc., and it is of the size of an atom. Hence it is improper to consider it as matter." This is the Vaiśesika view on the concept of mind. Acārya Pujyapāda refutes this contention by advancing the argument whether the mind is connected with the senses and the soul or not. "If it is not connected, then it cannot be of assistance to the soul, nor can it be of use to the senses. If it is connected, then the atomic mind connected with one point cannot leave that point and be of use to the other parts (of the soul or the other senses). Nor can it be said to rotate like the potter's wheel on account of an invisible force, as there can be no such capacity. The invisible force (adṛsta) is admitted to be the attribute of the non-material and inactive soul. Hence it is also inactive. Being inactive itself, it cannot be the cause of activity elsewhere. For instance, the wind is endowed with activity and touch, and it is naturally the cause of the wafting of plants and trees. But this invisible force is quite different from it and hence it cannot be the cause of activity. 2
Bhāvamana is jñāna (knowledge), which is the attribute of Soul, so it comes under Soul. "As the physical mind is characterized by colour, taste, smell and touch, it is a modification of matter. The physical mind is characterized by colour, tyste, smell and touch, for it is the cause of knowledge like the sense of sight."
197
Having followed the footsteps of Acārya Pūjyapāda, Akalanka also deals with the concept of mind by refuting the Samkhya, Buddhist and Vaiśeṣika views regarding it in his
1. Sarvarthasiddhi, V. 19 (comm.) Vide Reality, S. A. Jain p. 145.
2. Sarvarthasiddhi, p. 287.
3. Reality S. A. Jain. p. 131; Sarvarthasiddhi V. 3 (Comm)