Concept of Matter in Jaina Philosophy

SR No.: 001663
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: J C Sikdar
Publisher: P V Research Institute Varanasi
Publication Year: 1987
Total Pages: 412
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, & Physics
File Size: 23 MB

Page 154

Atomism
119
account of a second relation of inherence and so on ad infinitum, for the extreme difference of division is same (equal) in both the cases. Like this the relation of that inherence also with other inhering entities will have to be accepted. In this way there will be a fallacy of infinite regress. In reply to this Vaibesika view, Ācārya Sankara argues that the view of the Vaišeşikas is not correct in regard to this point. If it is so, i. e. the inherence is eternally present in the entities seen here and before us, saṁyoga (conjunction) also may be stated to be eternally connected with things which are joined together and need not depend upon a further connection (or relation). It will maintain eternal relation with own things which are joined together. For this reason (i. e. for its own companions) there is no necessity of the second relation of inherence. If it is argued that because of there being a second thing, the conjunction depends upon another relation, then inherence also, because of there being a second object, will depend upon other relation It is also not correct to say that there is no necessity of other relation (samavāya) for conjunction because of its being quality. Both of them are different from the terms they relate, for both of them depend upon the relation and to call one quality and the other non-quality is only found in the Vaisesika doctrine. For this reason, the dyad will not be produced from the two atoms on account of the fallacy of anavasthā (regress ad infinitum). Therefore, the atomic theory of the Vaiśesika is untenable.1
Ācārya Sankara asks the Vai esikas what kind of nature of atoms do they admit among the following : active nature (pravșttisvabhāva) or non-active nature (nirvșttisvabhāva) or both the natures or neither of them. Among these four alternatives the conception of an ultimate atom (paramāņu) as cause is untenable by any means. If it is said that there is the active nature of an ultimate atom, there will arise the problem of the
1. ŚBhā. on BS., II. 2. 13
Samavāyābhyupagamăcca sāmyādanavasthiteh.