Agam 05 Ang 05 Bhagvati Vyakhya Prajnapti Sutra

SR No.: 001628
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Jozef Deleu
Publisher: DE Tempel Brugge
Publication Year: 1970
Total Pages: 372
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Agam, Canon, & agam_bhagwati
File Size: 19 MB

Page 79

I 3
3. KANKHA-PAOSA.
1 (522) HAMG, as integral wholes, bind (karai) kan kh āmohanijja-kamma integrally. They bind it, accumulate it, make it effective, perceive it and annihilate it in the three times: past, present and future. One mnemonic gāhā.
The term kankha-paosa (= kāñksā-pradosa or -pradveşa, Abhay.) will appear in the text only in I 98.jivā ņam (thus!) resp. neraiyā ņam ... kade instead of jīvenam resp. neraienam ... kade: anticipating erroneous analogy of jīvā ņam ... karimsu.- kankha-mohanijja-kamma seems to be a subspecies of the confusing kind of karman (wherefore it was treated in I 3 as an introduction to mohanijja-kamma in I 4), viz the one that causes greed, not the karman that confuses in consequence of greed (kānkṣāyā mohanīyam) as Abhay. explains. k.-m.-k. 'undivided' and 'divided' (savva and desa) means 'with all resp. with part of the space-units (pradeśa)'; cf. Lehre par. 84. The mnemonic gāhā distinguishes between the continuance and the disappearance of k.-m.-k. at the stages enumerated (a quotation ?).
2 (54a) Its perceptibility is due to five causes (kārana): doubt (the beings are sankiyā), desire (... kankhiyā), uncertainty (... viigicchiyā), defection (... bheda-samāvannā) and blemish (... kalusasamāvannā). The stress is on the notion 'doubt'.
According to Abhay. (on kankha-paosa in 1 93) the notions kāňkşā (wish, desire, inclination) and sankā (doubt) are related thus: darśanântara-graho grddhir vā.
3 (54b) The teaching of the Lords is true and indubitable (nīsanka). He who holds to it is loyal to the commandment.
The half śloka tam eva saccam nisankam jam jinehim paveditam is also found in Ayāra I, p. 25 (= 1, 5, 5, 3).
4 (552) a. The attribute 'being existent' (atthitta) of a thing remains if, by some impulse from without or spontaneously, that thing undergoes accidental changes; and so does the attribute ‘being non-existent' (natthitta).
The three explanations in the comm, prove that Abhay. is utterly at a loss. I follow the first explanation. Potential existence is not lost in the paryāyas : a finger remains a finger whether it be straight or crooked, the earth of a clod of earth also exists in earthenware; the non-existence of an anguli in an arguștha is also found in the latter's modifications, earth being absent in a thread is also absent in the cloth made of it. This atthittam atthitte parinamai is as elementary a tenet as calamāņe calie etc. in I 11.
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