Reals on the Jaina Metaphysics

SR No.: 001619
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Harisatya Bhattacharya
Publisher: Shatnidas Khetsy Charitable Trust Mumbai
Publication Year: 1966
Total Pages: 430
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, Religion, & Epistemology
File Size: 8 MB

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Reals in the Jaina Metaphysics
WHERE THE JAINA'S AGREE WITH THE NYAYA
But the question that arises in connection with the above Sāmkhya position is: If the Soul is not an active agent, what is it that gets bondage and what is it that is emancipated? What is it that strives after salvation? If the Soul does not enjoy pleasure or pain how is the evolution and course of the world possible? To avoid these difficulties, the philosophers of the Nyāya school reject the doctrines of the Soul's non-agent-hood and non-enjoyer-hood and attribute to it the qualities of joy, activity etc. In this respect, the Jaina system may be said to agree with the Nyaya; they both repudiate the doctrine of the Soul's absolute indifference.
JAINA CRITICISM OF THE SAMKHYA POSITION
In criticism of the Samkhya theory, the Jaina's point out that if the Soul be held to be absolutely inactive, the act of perception also would be impossible for it. 'I hear', 'I smell', every one has got such feelings; this shows that the theory of the Soul's absolute inactivity is opposed to the experience and feeling of all men. It cannot be said that the feelings of 'I hear', 'I smell' etc. are due to Ahamkara or the principle of Egoism; for, then, consciousness which the Samkhya philosophers themselves attribute to the Soul, may also be said to be due to Ahaṁkāra. It is accordingly to be admitted that the Soul is an active agent. Another contention of the Samkhya is that the Soul in itself does not enjoy anything but that the fact of enjoyment is foisted upon it, so to say. Pleasure and pain are grasped by Buddhi or the principle of Intelligence and Buddhi is an evolute of Prakṛti. Hence the Samkhya contention is that the fact of the Purusa's enjoying pleasure or pain is imaginary only. It is Buddhi, an evolute of Prakṛti, which appropriates pleasure or pain; pleasure or pain is merely reflected in the Puruşa which is absolutely pure and incorruptible. The Jaina's maintain, on the contrary, that unless you admit some sort of modification of a thing, even a reflection in it is impossible. A piece of glass may be said to be modified in some way, when things are reflected in it. Accordingly,