Reals on the Jaina Metaphysics

SR No.: 001619
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Harisatya Bhattacharya
Publisher: Shatnidas Khetsy Charitable Trust Mumbai
Publication Year: 1966
Total Pages: 430
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, Religion, & Epistemology
File Size: 8 MB

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thus agree with thinkers of the Samkhya school in upholding the doctrine of the multiplicity of the Souls.
JAINA AGREEMENT WITH THE SĀMKHYA
With regard to the Advaita contention, the Jaina philosophers point out that on examination, a group of attributes e.g. existence, consciousness, joy, etc. will be discovered which are found in all the Souls. If we fix our attention to this group of common attributes all the Souls or Jiva's may be said to be one and identical in nature; for, this group of qualities is inherent in every Soul. The Vedānta position is true up to this point. But the above common attributes do not make up the whole of a Jiva; every Soul has its peculiarity as well. This peculiarity or individuality of a Soul differentiates it from another. If there were not this principle of separateness, all the Souls would have been emancipated as soon as one Soul attained salvation. It is because there is this element of particularity in each Soul, that the theory of the multiplicity of the Souls is to be admitted.
WHERE THE JAINA'S DIFFER FROM THE SAMKHYA POSITION
The Sāṁkhya and the Jaina philosophical systems, similar as they are, so far as the doctrine of the plurality of Souls is concerned, differ, however, with respect to the theories of ‘agent-hood and enjoyer-hood of the Soul. According to the Sāṁkhya, 'the Puruşa or the Soul is eternal, absolutely pure, intelligent and free'. It is absolutely un-attached to anything; is desireless; self-identical; and is never a doer or agent. It has no interest in or connection with the cosmic course. It is the Prakrti which on account of its proximity to the Soul evolves the universe; the Purușa on the contrary never does any act, nor enjoys the fruit of any action. It is absolutely passive (Niskriya) and a strict non-enjoyer (Abhoktā). Just as the Noumenal self of Kant has no connection with the Phenomenal psychical course, the Puruşa of the Sāṁkhya is absolutely unrelated to the phenomenal course of the world.