Reals on the Jaina Metaphysics

SR No.: 001619
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Harisatya Bhattacharya
Publisher: Shatnidas Khetsy Charitable Trust Mumbai
Publication Year: 1966
Total Pages: 430
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, Religion, & Epistemology
File Size: 8 MB

Page 110

Time
95
infinite Prakrti is compelled to undergo a successive series of evolutionary modifications. The Puruşa and the Praksti, when they come in contact with each other (Saṁgati) - find themselves limited by Time, i.e. compelled to pass through temporal successive series. Kāla, which is independent of one's momentary conscious states and impermanent modes of physical objects and thus objectively real to them, is nevertheless involved in the nature of the Puruşa and the Praksti, when they become Samgata and thereby limited.
THE SĀMKHYA AND THE Neo-PLATONIC THEORIES, EXAMINED IN LIGHT OF THE JAINA THEORY
We are not concerned here with the true nature of the soul or matter nor with the manner of their conjunction. We are concerned with the question: What is Time after all, according to the Neo-Platonic and the Sāṁkhya theories ? It is said to be involved in the nature of the soul and matter. The nature of the soul, however, consists in consciousness and that of matter, in material properties of extension, etc. Time is neither consciousness nor any of the material attributes. Thus 'involved in the nature of the soul and matter does not mean that Time is identical with either soul or matter. It is something other than the soul or matter, which, as the Sāṁkhya and the Neo-Platonic thinkers themselves admit, accounts for the series of their mundane modifications. This is exactly the Jaina view of Time. Kāla or Time does not pertain to the essential nature of substances. Its ‘being involved in their nature' means that Kāla is associated with them, being the external condition of their modifications, in and through which they persist in their essential nature.'
Akalanka-deva means this by saying:
सत्वात्त इति चेन्न, तस्याप्यनुग्रहात् You cannot say that Kāla is involved in the existence (or the essential nature) of things; for, it (i.e. persistence in their essential nature) is dependent on Kāla.