Reals on the Jaina Metaphysics

SR No.: 001619
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Harisatya Bhattacharya
Publisher: Shatnidas Khetsy Charitable Trust Mumbai
Publication Year: 1966
Total Pages: 430
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, Religion, & Epistemology
File Size: 8 MB

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Reals in the Jaina Metaphysics from experience but quite independent of the things experienced. It would thus appear that if the element of divine creation which can scarcely be reconciled with the admittedly eternal nature of Time be eliminated from the theories of Plato, St. Augustine and Leibnitz, their doctrines of Time would agree with the Jaina theory, so far as the question of its objective reality is concerned. It is worthy of notice in this connection that the Nyāya and the Vaiseșika schools admit the existence of God; but they say that Käla or Time is eternal and not a creation of God. Their theory of Time is thus similar to that of the Jaina's who nevertheless deny the existence of a creator God.
THE NEO-PLATONIC THEORY OF TIME: SCHELLING'S THEORY
The Neo-Platonists admitted that Time was not only real but in a sense objectively real also. It is objectively real in the sense that our momentary selves and fleeting conscious states do not create it. They maintained that Time was the life of the soul, contained, beheld and involved in it. Plotinus urged that Time was practically the ceaseless energy of the soul seeking to realise its infinite and eternal being in matter. As it is impossible for the soul to do so all at once, it goes through a series of successive acts or moments. This Neo-Platonic theory was subsequently revived by Schelling. According to it, Time is real, in a sense, objectively real also, but all the same involved in the very being of the soul.
THE SAMKHYA THEORY OF TIME
The Sāṁkhya theory of Time, though not very clear, may be construed in a way which would give it a very remote resemblance to the above Neo-Platonic doctrine. According to the Sāṁkhya, Kāla is the Sangati or conjunction of the Purusa and the Praksti, the two self-existent and eternal Reals. The implication of this Samgati doctrine may be said to be: 1. That, on the one hand, Puruşa or the infinite soul, coming in contact with Prakřti, finds itself finite and compelled to realise its nature in a series of succes.sive acts i.e. in Kāla and 2. that on the other hand the