Studies in Jaina Philosophy

SR No.: 001616
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Nathmal Tatia
Publisher: Jain Cultural Research Society
Publication Year: 1951
Total Pages: 366
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, Knowledge, Yoga, & Epistemology
File Size: 9 MB

Page 78

II]
MATI-JNANA : APAYA
arthāvagraha (object-perception) is the dawning of awareness, and ihā is determinate tendency towards the ascertainment of the particular nature of the object. Though ihā is a kind of speculation, it is to be distinguished from samsaya (doubt). Jinabhadra has drawn this very fine line of distinction between samsaya (doubt) and īhā. 'The mental state which relates to many (mutually contradictory) objects, which is stupefied owing to its incapacity for exclusion (of the false), and which seems to retire into a perfectly supine condition, is noncognition (ajñāna) of the nature of doubt. And the mental state which strives for the ascertainment of the truth by means of reason and logic, which is destined to be successful, and which tends towards the acceptance of the true and avoidance of the untrue is called ihā.' Siddhasenaganin also draws the same line of distinction between ihã and samsaya (doubt).2 All the Jaina logicians have unanimously given the same view of ihā and so we do not mention their definitions separately.
(c) Apāya or Avāya (Perceptual Judgment) After ihā (speculation) there arises apāya which excludes the nonexistent characteristics. Thă (speculation) is enquiry about right and wrong. Apāya is ascertainment of the right and exclusion of the wrong. It, therefore, is a determinate cognition of the object. Apāya can be rendered as “perceptual judgment'. The Āvaśyakaniryukti defines apāya as determinate cognition'.4 Apāya involves determination of the existent qualities and exclusion of the non-existent qualities. For instance, when on hearing a sound one determines that the sound must be of the conch and not of the horn, because it is accompanied by such qualities as sweetness, it is a case of apāya (perceptual judgment).5 The Sarvārthasiddhi defines it as 'cognition of the true nature on account of the cognition of the particular characteristics'. Jinabhadra quotes an opinion which regarded apāya as only excluding the non-existent characteristics and attributed the function of cognizing the existent characteristics to dhāranā (retention) which brings up the rear of apāya.? He criticizes the opinion as absurd and states that
1 jam anegatthālambaņam apajjudāsaparikumthiyam cittam seya iva savvappayao tam samsayarūvam annāņam. tam ciya sayatthaheü-vivattivā varatapparamamoham bhūyābhūya-visesäyāņa-ccāyābhimuham ihä.
-Vibh, 183-84. 2 Tīkā on TSūBh, I. 15.
3 avagrhīte vișaye samyag asamyag iti guņa-dosa-vicāraņā-'dhyavasāyāpanodo 'pāyaḥ-TSūBh, I. 15. 4 vavasāyam ca avāyaḥ--Vibh, 179 (Niryuktigāthā).
5 ViBh, 290. • višeşa-nirjñānãd yāthātmyāvagamanam avāyaḥ,SSi, I. 15. ? Vibh, 185. JP-6