Studies in Jaina Philosophy

SR No.: 001616
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Nathmal Tatia
Publisher: Jain Cultural Research Society
Publication Year: 1951
Total Pages: 366
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, Knowledge, Yoga, & Epistemology
File Size: 9 MB

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PROBLEM OF AVIDYA
[CH.
separate category which is different from both identity and difference, The actual is real, and because the data of experience are neither identifiable with experience, as the Buddhist subjectivist avers in defiance of the plain verdict of experience, nor can they be regarded as unrelated which the assertion of absolute difference involves, the relation is, sui generis which is also admitted by the Vedāntist to be the case when he asserts that the data of experience are indeterminable as identical or not-identical. But whereas the Vedāntist would assert that the appearance is false, the Jaina would assert that it is true. The contradiction between identity and difference is not denied. But the Jaina does not think that the relation is of either kind. It is different from both, and its reality cannot be repudiated because it is felt to be actual.
The denial of causality constitutes a flagrant violation of experience. When the Vedāntist asserts that the effect is not produced by itself or by another, and yet cannot blink the actual production of the effect, he fails to render an explanation of it. He thinks that no explanation is possible and the confession of this failure only shows that he only pretends to slip over the problem. Certainly by declaring causality as unreal appearance he proves disloyal to experience. If the nature of reality could be determined by abstract logic, and that again in plain contradiction of experience, then there is no reason why should the Vedāntist refuse to chime in with the Buddhist when he declares that there is no self. The Vedāntist, as we have shown, cannot find flaw in the Buddhist's argument except by appeal to experience. The Vedāntist appeals to dream experience in support of his position that the unitary self-identical Absolute appears as the plurality of phenomena. He asserts that the appearance of plurality is not impossible even when what exists in reality is the undifferenced unitary existence. It is argued that in dream a plurality of facts is experienced though it is one consciousness that only exists and is felt. It is one consciousness that is felt as many. The Jaina does not agree with this interpretation of dream experience. He asserts that if there be inherent opposition between unity and plurality the appearance of one consciousness as plurality even in dream is not possible. As regards the Vedāntist's contention that only one consciousness appears as a plurality in dream, the Jaina thinks that it is an assumption unsupported by logic as well as experience. Even in dream as in wakeful experience, the consciousness of action is different from that of the agent. It is admitted even by the Vedāntist that dream contents are produced by different memory-impressions and so the contention that there is no plurality of cognitions though there is plurality of contents in dream experience cannot be accepted to be a true estimate. As regards the appearance of plurality, the Jaina does not find any difficulty in it that a self-identical subject should experience