Studies in Jaina Philosophy

SR No.: 001616
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Nathmal Tatia
Publisher: Jain Cultural Research Society
Publication Year: 1951
Total Pages: 366
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, Knowledge, Yoga, & Epistemology
File Size: 9 MB

Page 204

III. XI] CRITICISM OF THE NYAYA-VAISEȘIKA AVIDYĀ
167
be known in its true nature.'! The nature of the body, the senseorgans, and the like alone is to be known in order to destroy the attachment to them. Emancipation is attained when the delusion about these things is gone and freedom from the defects (dosa) is achieved.2 Now the difficulty is if wrong cognition (ajñāna) is the condition of bondage how is it that the knowledge of a limited number of things is efficient enough to destroy the bondage in spite of the existence of wrong cognition about so many other things? Wrong cognition cannot be totally removed because the objects of cognition are infinite. And how can there be emancipation if there is the least of wrong cognition? Wrong cognition is invariably and necessarily accompanied with bondage, and there cannot be total destruction of wrong cognition unless omniscience is achieved. Omniscience, however, cannot be achieved unless all the objects are known. In other words, if wrong cognition is the invariable, necessary and unconditional cause of bondage, there can never be emancipation because there can never be omniscience, and without omniscience the bondage cannot be destroyed. The Nyāya-Vaiseșika believes in wrong cognition as the invariable cause of bondage and at the same time does not regard omniscience as the pre-requisite of emancipation. This is responsible for the difficulty of emancipation. Samantabhadra has put this logical difficulty in an aphoristic and pregnant language as follows: 'If bondage is the necessary concomitant of ignorance (ajñāna) there cannot be a being free from bondage because of the infiniteness of the objects (to be known). If the knowledge of a few objects is responsible for freedom (from bondage), the vast amount of ignorance (about other objects) is responsible for the reverse.'3 The Nyāya-Vaišeșika position is not consistent enough with its original proposition. If ignorance or wrong cognition is held as the necessary, invariable and unconditional cause of bondage, it is of necessity to be granted that omniscience is achieved before the bondage is destroyed. But the Nyāya-Vaišesika does not admit that omniscience is necessary for emancipation. The Jainas, on the other hand, do not regard wrong cognition (ajñāna) alone as the necessary and unconditional cause of bondage. Samantabhadra says: 'Wrong cognition accompanied with delusion (moha) is the cause of bondage. From wrong cognition devoid of delusion, there
i na tävad ekaikatra yāvadvişayam utpadyate jñeyānām anantyāt nā 'pi kvacid utpadyate, yatra no 'tpadyate tatrā 'nivịtto moha iti mohaseșaprasangaḥ, na că 'nyavişayeņa tattvajñānenā 'nyavişayo mohaḥ śakyaḥ pratişeddhum iti. mithyājñānam vai khalu moho na tattvajñānasyā 'nutpattimātram tac ca mithyajñānam yatra visa ye pravartamānam samsära-bījam bhavati sa visayas tattvato jñeya iti-Bhāsya, NS, IV. 2. 1.
2 For detailed information vide supra, pp. 106-7. 3 ajñānāc cet dhruvo bandho jñeyānantyān na kevali
jñānastokad vimokşaś ced ajñānād bahuto 'nyatha-Aptamimārzsā, 96.