Studies in Jaina Philosophy

SR No.: 001616
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Nathmal Tatia
Publisher: Jain Cultural Research Society
Publication Year: 1951
Total Pages: 366
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, Knowledge, Yoga, & Epistemology
File Size: 9 MB

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PROBLEM OF AVIDYA
[CH.
instance, one imposes the external attributes upon the ätman (self) when one says 'I am crippled (vikala) or whole (sakala)' when it is only his son or wife that is so; or sometimes the attributes of the body as in I am fať, 'I am thin', and so on ; or sometimes the attributes of the sense-organs as in 'I am dumb', 'I am one-eyed', and so on ; or sometimes the attributes of the mind (antaḥkarana) such as desire, intention, doubt and the like. Thus one superimposes the ego upon the self which is only the transcendental witness of the mind and its activities, and then again reversely superimposes the self, the witness of all, upon the ego. Thus there is this beginningless, endless, natural (naisargika) adhyasa (superimposition) of the nature of wrong cognition (mithyapratyayarūpah), the cause of agency and enjoyment (of the individual souls) and patent to all.' This beginningless adhyāsa or avidyā, consisting in the mutual identification of the self and the not-self, is the presupposition of all ordinary or scriptural distinctions between means and ends, subjects and objects, in one word, between one thing and another. Even our philosophical and spiritual enquiries presuppose this avidyā.? It is indeed a palpable absurdity to imagine that the not-self is superimposed upon the self and vice versa. But nevertheless it is a fact that our ordinary experience presupposes this identification. Otherwise we cannot explain such experiences as I am fat', 'I am dumb' and the like. The object is superimposed upon the conscious subject, and the conscious subject is seemingly superimposed upon the object. The not-self is identified with the self and so is known and expressed, though the not-self has not the capacity to reveal or express itself.
But this identification is not one-sided. Were it so, there would be a complete merger of one in the other. In other words, either it will be the object and the not-self, or the subject and the self. But however intimately the self and the not-self are connected, the self does not become the not-self, and conversely the not-self does not become the self. The two poles exist side by side and because they are related, they must be accepted to become identical or not-different. The not-self is a non-entity. Yet it appears to be an entity because it is felt as identical with the self. And in this act of identification, the self also has to contribute a part. And this contribution consists in the seeming transference of being and manifestation to the not-self
1 adhyāsonāma atasmims tadbuddhi ity avocāma ... evam ahampratyayinam aśeşa-svapracāra-sākşiņi pratyagātmani adhyasya tam ca pratyagätmānam sarva-sākşiņam tadviparyayeņa antaḥkaraņādişv adhyavasyati, evam ayam anādir ananto naisargiko 'dhyāso mithyapratyayarūpah kartstvabhoktrtva-pravartakaḥ sarvaloka-pratyaksah-Ibid.
2 Cf. tam etam avidyākhyam ātmānātmanor itaretarādhyâsam puraskrtya Sarve pramana-prameya vyavahārā laukikā vaidikāś ca pravsttāḥ sarvāṇi ca śāstrāņi vidhi-pratişedha-mokşaparāņi-Ibid.