Studies in Jaina Philosophy

SR No.: 001616
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Nathmal Tatia
Publisher: Jain Cultural Research Society
Publication Year: 1951
Total Pages: 366
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, Knowledge, Yoga, & Epistemology
File Size: 9 MB

Page 135

98
PROBLEM OF AVIDYA
[CH.
upon the buddhi in order to produce the appearance of identity. Now this operation can be possible in two ways: (1) by arresting the normal activity of the buddhi and (2) by misguidance of the buddhi. By the first kind of operation, buddhi is thwarted and made incapable of cognizing the difference, and by the second kind of operation the buddhi is made to mistake the one for the other. The Yogasūtra and the Bhāsya do not affirm one and negate the other of these possible operations of avidyā and so we are at liberty to accept any or both of the two operations. If we admit avidyā as having the capacity of thwarting the buddhi, the doctrine of aviveka will follow. And if we ascribe to the avidyā the capacity of misguiding the buddhi the doctrine of anyathākhyāti will be the logical deduction.
Let us now see what Patañjali's definition would imply. The definition can symbolically be expressed as avidyā=cognition of A as B. Now this definition can imply either (I) that both A and B are the objects of cognition which has failed to cognize their difference and consequently they appear as one, or (2) that only B is the object of cognition and consequently it alone appears. In the first case the doctrine of aviveka is the implication, and in the second the doctrine of anyathākhyāti is implied.
Thus it is established that the doctrine of aviveka is not inconsistent with the Yoga system, and also that Patañjali's definition of avidyā can be interpreted as implying the doctrine of aviveka as well. Vijñānabhikṣu's insistence, therefore, that the Yoga accepts the doctrine of anyathākhyāti as distinguished from the doctrine of aviveka of the Sankhya is not based upon valid grounds.
It is beyond doubt that the Sankhya theory of error called avivekakhyāti or viveka-'khyāti is not to be confounded with Prabhākara's theory. Prabhākara believes that there is no error possible and the proposition 'This is silver' does not point to a unitary judgment. This stands for the substratum which is real and ‘silver' is the object of recollection without being felt as recollected. Thus this recollected silver is real because only a perceived fact can be recollected. But 'this' which is a perceived fact and ‘silver' which is the remembered fact are not realized as distinct. The copula 'is' in the judgment symbolizes the non-apprehension of unrelatedness. The pseudo-subject and the pseudo-predicate are not felt as unrelated which they are in point of reality. So there is no perversion in the objective plane. And on the subjective plane also there is no confusion which would have
n had the subject and the predicate been felt as related. There is perception of the substratum and recollection of silver, and these two acts of cognition are not felt as distinct. But mere non-perception of
nitya-suci-sukhā-'tma
1 The definition is anitya-'suci-duhkhả-'nātmasu khyātir avidya-YD, II. 5.