Studies in Jaina Philosophy

SR No.: 001616
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Nathmal Tatia
Publisher: Jain Cultural Research Society
Publication Year: 1951
Total Pages: 366
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, Knowledge, Yoga, & Epistemology
File Size: 9 MB

Page 132

III. III]
AVIDYA IN THE SAMKHYA SCHOOL
95
the illustrations of Māthara and Gaudapāda. Vācaspati gives the same illustrations and furthermore supplies the corresponding Yoga terminology. Unfortunately we do not find clear definitions of tamas, moha etc. in the Sankhyakārikā itself, and have to depend upon the commentaries. But we find nothing against our view that the Yoga and the Sāńkhya do not differ as regards their conception of viparyaya or avidyā.
Vijñānabhikṣu, however, has attempted to differentiate between the Yoga and the Sānkhya conception of viparyaya. Thus, commenting on the Yoga aphorism viz. viparyayo mithyājñānam atadrūpapratisthamVijñānabhikṣu says: 'In this (Yoga)-śāstra anyathākhyāti is the doctrine (of error) and not avivekamātra as propounded by the Sankhya'. He quotes the aphorism Avidyā consists in the comprehension of non-eternal as eternal, impure as pure, sorrow as joy and non-soul as soul'' in order to show that the Yoga conception of avidyā implies the doctrine of anyathākhyāti which holds that error consists in the cognition of one thing in the character of another, or the superimposition of one thing upon another. He further distinguishes the Yoga anyathākhyāti from the Vaiseșika anyathākhyāti on the ground that in the Yoga doctrine the content of the cognition is held to be superimposed upon the external thing while in the Vaiseșika doctrine one external object is superimposed upon another external, object.5 Vijñānabhikṣu further substantiates his position while commenting on the statement of the Yogabhāsya that avidyā is neither 'valid cognition' nor 'absence of cognition', but it is a 'false cognition' and as such is a category of cognition. There he says: 'In this (Yoga) system the term avidyā does not mean aviveka i.e. non-discrimination in the sense of negation of discrimination as it does with the followers of Sānkhya. But it (viz. avidyā) is a species of determinate cognition or judgment as it is with such schools as the Vaiśesika. This follows from both the Sūtra and the Bhāşya'.'
Let us try to understand Vijñānabhikṣu's conception of aviveka, Yoga anyathākhyāti and Vaiśesika anyathākhyāti. According to Vijñānabhikṣu, the absolutely non-existent such as square-circle cannot be the object of knowledge, and so he holds that in such cases as the
erroneous cognition of silver in conch-shell, dreams and imaginations, . it is the mind-transformation that is the object or content of knowledge,
See Also Yogavārttika, YD, I. 8.
2 His disciple Bhāvāgaņeśa follows him. See his commentary Dipikā, YD, I. 8. 3 YD, I. 8.
4 YD, II. 5. 5 Cf. Vaiseşikāc cã 'trā 'yam višeşo yad bāhya-raja tāder nä 'ropaḥ kintv āntarasyai 've 'ti-Vārttika, YD, I. 8.
6 YD, II. 5. 1 asmimś ca darśane Sānkhyānām ivā 'viveko nā 'vidyāśabdārthaḥ kim tu Vaišeşikādivad visişta-jñānam eve 'ti Sūtra-B häsyābhyām avagantavyamVārttika on YD, II. 5.