Reality English Translation of Sarvarthasiddhi

SR No.: 001197
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: S A Jain
Publisher: Jwalamalini Trust Chennai
Publication Year: 1992
Total Pages: 334
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, Tattvartha Sutra, Tattvartha Sutra, & Tattvarth
File Size: 20 MB

Page 46

18
THE FRUIT OF KNOWLEDGE
the fruit. But such a contention is untenable. If connection is considered pramāṇa and knowledge of objects is considered the fruit, then connection rests in two things1. Similarly the fruit, knowledge, must also reside in two things. Hence knowledge must be in the object also, and the objects etc. would become knowledge. But the opponent says that the soul is characterized by consciousness, and so knowledge inheres in the soul and not in other objects. No. If the soul is not of the nature of knowledge, all would become non-conscious. Or, if it is accepted that the soul is of the nature of knowledge, then it would contradict his doctrine.
Now it has been contended that there is no fruit if knowledge is pramāņa. It does not matter. There is satisfaction in the attainment of knowledge. The soul, whose nature of knowledge is clouded by the foreign matter of karma, finds satisfaction in determining the nature of substances with the help of the senses. That is spoken of as the fruit. Or the attainment of equanimity or the disappearance of ignorance may be considered the fruit. Equanimity is freedom from attachment and aversion. The disappearance of ignorance which is like darkness is called the fruit.
That which knows rightly, that by which anything is known or knowledge alone is pramāņa. What is known by this? The soul and the other substances. Now, if pramāna is the means for knowing the soul and the other substances, then there must be another pramāņa for knowing pramāņa. And that will lead to a regression. No, there is no regression. Pramāņa or knowledge is like the lamp. The lamp is the cause of illuminating objects like the pitcher, the cloth and so on. It is also the cause of illuminating its own nature or form. And there is no need to seek after another illuminating cause. It must be admitted that pramāna also is like the lamp. If another pramāņa is necessary to ascertain pramāņa as in the case of the objects, then there can be no memory or remembrance, as it does not know itself. In that case there can be no social relationship.
1 Connection rests in two things, namely the sense-organ and the object.