Reality English Translation of Sarvarthasiddhi

SR No.: 001197
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: S A Jain
Publisher: Jwalamalini Trust Chennai
Publication Year: 1992
Total Pages: 334
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, Tattvartha Sutra, Tattvartha Sutra, & Tattvarth
File Size: 20 MB

Page 45

THE TWO TYPES OF VALID KNOWLEDGE
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science. Indirect knowledge is mentioned before direct knowledge, as it is easily intelligible. These are heard by, familiar to and experienced by all beings; for these are mostly attained by them. Thus these are the five kinds of knowledge. Their subdivisions are mentioned later.
It has been said that knowledge is attained by means of pramāna and naya. Some consider that knowledge is pramāna, some others that connection is pramāna, and yet others that the senses constitute pramāna. Hence the next sutra is intended to declare that those mentioned alone constitute pramāņa.
तत्प्रमाणे Tatpramāne.
(10) 10. These (five kinds of knowledge) are the two types of pramāņa (valid knowledge).
What is the purport of 'that' (tad)? It is intended to preclude any other pramāna invented by others. Some consider the connection of sense-organs with their objects as pramāna. Some others consider the senses as pramāna. The word 'that' is used in order to preclude these. These alone, sensory knowledge etc., constitute pramāna, and not any other.
What is wrong if connection or the senses .were pramāņa ? If connection were pramāna, then there would be no knowledge of infinitesimal, concealed and remote things. These cannot be contacted by the senses. Hence there would be no omniscience. If the senses also were considered as pramāņa, it would result in the same defect or fallacy. The range of the senses such as the eyes is small, and the objects are endless.
Further, connection does not apply to all the senses, as the eyes and the mind do not come in contact with the objects. This is discussed later.
If knowledge is pramāna, it is contended that there is no fruit. But attainment of knowledge is accepted as the fruit and not anything else. If knowledge were pramāņa, something else cannot be the fruit. But pramāna must have fruit. If connection or the sense-organ be pramāņa, knowledge, which is something different from these, is fit to be considered