Slokavartika a Study

SR No.: 001133
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: K K Dixit, Nagin J Shah, Dalsukh Malvania
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad
Publication Year: 1983
Total Pages: 132
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, Nyay, Tattvartha Sutra, & Tattvarth
File Size: 11 MB

Page 85

76
bited by a particular object signify the presence in this object of the corresponding "universals' which are of the form of an eternal-ubiquitous object as real as the particular object itself; and it is his understanding that a 'universal' is grasped by prec. eption as much as by inference. So Kumārila begins his polemic by emphasizing that the object of inferential cognition is something indisputably real (v. 147), that a 'universal' is something real (v. 148), that a tuniversal' is cognized through perception (v. 148). Then he arguec that to say that a common feature is cognized through inference alone must lead to an infinite règress (vv. 149-53). For an inference must require the prior cognition of the probans which has to be of the form of a common feature, but if a common feature is cognized through inference alone then the cognition of this probans must require another inference and the process should go on and infinitum. Kumārila also rejects the defence that the probans of an inference is cognized not through inference but through another means of cognition (vv. 154-56). For if this means is a means of valid cognition then being competent to cognize a common feature it should render redundant the positing of inference as a means of valid cognition while if it is merely a means of cognicion then the cognition of the probans through its instrumentality should not lead to a valid inference-just as the mistaken cognition of vapour as smoke does not lead to the valid inference of fire. Kumärila similarly rejects the submission that the probans of an inference is cognized through memory and that even if memory is not a means of valid cognition the memory of probans is instrumental in a valid inference just as the memory of vyapti is (vv. 157-60). For the memory of a vyāpti is possible because this vyapti was once cognized through preception, but the memory of a probans is not possible because this probans is of the form of a common feature while on the Buddhist's view a common feature is never cognized through perception. As Kumärila bitingly remarks, if one can have memory of what one has not cognized through perception then one can as well have memory of a barren woman's son. His point is that unless a common feature is actually preceived at the time of perceiving a concerned particular object no subsequent perception of this par ticular object should call back to mind this common feature (vv. 161-65). Lastly, Kumārila dismisses the suggestion that the cognition of a probans takes place on account of the väsana or impressions retained in mind (v. 167). He does not argue that such an impression too presupposes a prior perceptual cognition (perhaps for the fear of being answered back that this inpression could well be a heritage of a past birth) but only that in that in case the cognition of the probandum too should take place on account of the våsands themselves-without needing an inference. Kumārila goes on to and that one who like him posits additional means of valid cognition be. sides perception and inference can possibly conceive of a case where the probans is cognized neither through perception nor through inference but that this alternative is not open to the Buddhist who points just two means of valid cognition (vv. 168-69). As a general rule, however, Kumārila's own position is that a probans is cognized either through perception or through inference (v. 170-71). Then keeping in mind
Slokavartika-a study