Slokavartika a Study

SR No.: 001133
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: K K Dixit, Nagin J Shah, Dalsukh Malvania
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad
Publication Year: 1983
Total Pages: 132
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, Nyay, Tattvartha Sutra, & Tattvarth
File Size: 11 MB

Page 84

Means of Valid Cognition Other Than Verbal Testimony
inference should not be such a one as stands contradicted by the findings of another means of valid cognition. And since according to Kumārila the means of valid cogni. tion are six in all he divides an invalid paksa into six subtypes each contradicted through one particular means of valid cognition (vv.58-59). For example, preception contradicts the thesis 'a word is imperceptible' (v. 59), inference contradicts the thesis "a word is inaudible' (vv. 60-61). The thesis contradicted through verbal testimony might be of three types, viz.
(i) that contradicted through one's own words—e.g. someone saying 'I never speak' 'All statements are false’ ‘My mother is barren',
(ii) that contradicted through the established position of one's school-e. g. the Buddhist saying that a word is eteroal,
(iii) that contradicted through popular usage-e. g. someone saying 'candra is not the word for moon' (vv. 91-65).
The remaining subtypes are illustrated through the well-known examples that Kumärila employs while offering an account of the three remaining means of valid cognition, an account we have yet to examine (vv. 65-69). When illustrations have been offered for all the six subtypes Kumärila relates that in all those illustrations what stood contradicted was a character but that smilarly there might be cases where what stands contradicted is a thing characterized,' both a character and the thing characterized, a particular aspect of a character, a particular aspect of a thing characterized, a particular aspect of a character and one of the thing chararcterized (in each case the thing contradicted being mentioned explicitly or implicitly) (vv. 70-71). But as we have already found in connection with our examination of Kumārila's account of the hetvābhāsa viruddha all this is very much confusing.
(v) The Object of Inferential Cognition
Something Real or Something Fictitious
Kumātila closes his treatment of inference with a discussion of the general question as to whether the object of inferential cognition is something real or something fictitious. The occasion for the discussion arises because of certain positions maintained by the Buddhist. Thus the Buddhist posits just two means of valid cogition, viz. perception and inference and it is his understanding that perception is competent to cognize a particular object but not the common features exhibited by it while inference competent to cognize the common features exhibited by a particular object but not this particular object-also that a particular object is something real while the common features exhibited by it something fictitious. All these positions Kumārila seeks to controvert in the present part of his text. On his showing the common features exhi.