Central Philosophy of Jainism Anekanta Vada

SR No.: 001129
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Bimal Krishna Matilal, Nagin J Shah, Dalsukh Malvania
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad
Publication Year: 1981
Total Pages: 84
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, B000, & B025
File Size: 5 MB

Page 57

48
The Central Philosophy of Jainism
can be seen as an improved and more precise formulation of the earlier, rather imprecise, fivefold formula. The Madhyamika denial of the fourfold alternative was:
(1) Question: “Does the effect come out of itself:” Answer: "No." (2) Q: “Does it come out of the others ?” A: “No.” (3) Q: “Does it come out of both itself and other ?" A: "No." (4) Q: “Does it come out of neither (self or other)?” A: "No."98 It should be noted that the Buddhist answers to all these alternative questions were, like the answers of Sañjaya, in the negative.
Scholars like Hermann Jacobi have surmised that Mahāvira established the sevenfold syāt predication in opposition to the “ Agnosticism” of Sañjaya.99 There seems to be some truth in this claim. For Mahāvira adopted the method of answering all metaphysical/philosophical questions with a qualified yes. But, as I have already noted, there is no textual evidence (either in the Pāli or in the Prakrit canons) to show that Mahāvira had actually used the sevenfold syāt predication. K. N. Jayatilleke has apparently been very critical of Jacobi's view in this matter. He has been eager to show that the two ( the Jaina formula and the Sañjaya formula) “ seem to have a common origin."100 In his eagerness to show this "common origin" Jayatilleke has mistranslated syāt as "may be." I find the argument of Jayatilleke unconvincing as a rebuttal of Jacobi's thesis, viz., Mahāvira's philosophy was formulated in opposition to the philosophy of Sañjaya. It is undeniable that while the former preferred a conditional affirmation of the answers to questions about after-life etc., the latter preferred a straightforward denial.
Although Sanjaya resembled the Buddhist in giving negative answers to the metaphysical questions, we should note that Sañjaya's philosophic conclusion was different from that of Nāgārjuna. Out of respect for truth and out of fear of, and distaste for, falsehood ( cf. musāvāda-bhayā) Sañjaya adopted a non-committal attitude towards questions about afterlife etc. His position was that definite knowledge about such matters as after-life was impossible to obtain, and he had the boldness to confess it. Thus, I think the Pāli commentator was a bit unfair when he called him an "eel-wriggler."
Nāgārjuna's position was slightly different from that of total noncommitment. From the denial of the fourfold alternative, Nāgārjuna was led to a definite philosophic conclusion that these questions about after-life,