Central Philosophy of Jainism Anekanta Vada

SR No.: 001129
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Bimal Krishna Matilal, Nagin J Shah, Dalsukh Malvania
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad
Publication Year: 1981
Total Pages: 84
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, B000, & B025
File Size: 5 MB

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THE SEVEN STANDPOINTS
Tattvārthasūtra 1.6 says that philosophic understanding is generated by both pramānas (means of knowledge) and nayas (discussion of standpoints). In other philosophical schools, it is asserted that reality is revealed through pramāņas or means of knowledge (cf. pramāņādhinā vastusiddhih). Thus the Jainas requisition the service of the doctrine of standpoints, in addition to that of pramāṇas, for the ascertainment of reality. A thing, according to the Jainas, has innumerable characteristics, and a pramāņa may not reveal its detailed features. Thus the standpoints, by putting emphasis on one aspect or the other, can help us to grasp reality completely and in a proper manner.
What is the distinction between a pramāna and a naya? A pramāna reveals the thing as a whole cf. (sakala-grāhin) while a naya reveals only a portion of it (amśa-grāhin). A naya is only a part of a pramāṇa and hence it cannot be identical with the pramāņa. A pramāna is compared to an ocean while nayas or standpoints are like ocean-water kept in different pitchers. 82
Akalanka has described the standpoints as the hidden intentions or presuppositions of inquirers, different points of view of persons searching for the truth.83 Akalanka further states that a pramāņa results in knowledge while a standpoint is only a view of the knower. Each viewer views a thing from a particular point. Thus, the nature of the thing that is revealed to him is necessarily conditioned or colored or limited by his particular point of view. This amounts to saying that only a partial aspect of reality is revealed to him. As long as he is not conscious that he views reality only from one among infinite number of points of view, his metaphysical thesis will remain 'one-sided' ekānta. To remedy this defect, the Jainas teach the doctrine of standpoints. Thus, Siddhasena notes in his Nyāyāvatāra (verese 29):
“Since a thing has manifold character, it is comprehended (only) by the omniscient. But a thing becomes the subject matter of a naya, when it is conceived from one particular standpoint."
How many points of view are there from which one can view reality ? Since a thing has infinitefold constitution, according to the Jainas, there should be an infinite number of points of view. Siddhasena accepts this theoretical possibility :84