Central Philosophy of Jainism Anekanta Vada

SR No.: 001129
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Bimal Krishna Matilal, Nagin J Shah, Dalsukh Malvania
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad
Publication Year: 1981
Total Pages: 84
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, B000, & B025
File Size: 5 MB

Page 39

VII
THE JAINA NAYAS AND THE MADHYAMIKA
DIALECTIC
It will be interesting to compare the Jaina doctrine of Nayas 'standpoints' with Mādhyamika dialectic. The Jainas argue that different philosophers, when they construct different philosophical systems, emphasize different 'standpoints.' The Jainas further point out that as long as we emphasize one aspect or standpoint (say the standpoint of 'substance') while being fully aware that this is only one out of many, equally viable, standpoints, we employ a naya 'a right philosophical method.' But when we emphasize only one standpoint by excluding all others, we employ a durnaya 'an incorrect philosophical method.' The business of the anekānta philosophy is to expose a durnaya, and isolate and identify the nayas.
Following the above principle, the Jainas assert that reality appears to be unchanging when we consider its 'substantial' aspect, but it seems to be everchanging when we consider its qualities and modes. Other philosophers suffer from partiality of their outlook while the Jainas try to overcome partiality and one-sidedness and search for the totality of outlook, for omniscience,
How does the Jaina position differ from that of the Mādhyamikas ? The Madhyamikas also emphasize the paradoxicality of change and continuity. But they derive a different philosophic conclusion from this premise, for they do not share the same synthesizing and conciliatory (anekānta) attitude of the Jainas. The inherent paradoxicality of the notion of causation is, for the Madhyamikas, the ground for mistrusting the basic premise upon which the thesis of causality is grounded : viz., a thing exists by its 'one-nature' or essence (svabhāva). Thus, the point is driven home by the Mādhyamikas that a thing is empty of its ‘own-nature' or essence, and this culminates in their thesis of Emptiness' (Sūnyatā).
To illustrate Nāgārjuna's philosphic argumentation, let me quote two verses from the Mädhyamika-Kärikā:
"The "own-nature' (of a thing) cannot be generated by causal conditions (hetus and pratyayas). For if the ‘own-nature' is generated by causal conditions, it would be (artificially) created." “Now, how could ‘own- nature' be (artificially) created ? For,