Some Remarks on The Pramanyavada of Jainism

Author(s): Atsushi Uno
Publisher: Z_Kailashchandra_Shastri_Abhinandan_Granth_012048.pdf
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/212130/1

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SOME REMARKS ON THE PRAMANYA-VADA OF JAINISM Dr. Atsushi Uno, Hiroshima University, Hiroshima, Japan The pramanya-vada deals with a problem how the truth value of a cognition is determined objectively and subjectively. This has for a long time been of interest to all the Indian philosophical systems, as was the problem of the knowledge and the means thereof. As regards the determination of the truth value of a cognition, viz. truth (pramanya) and falsity (apramanya), most of the philosophical systems accept either of the two alternatives : whether the truth value of cognition, in origination (utpatti) and apprehension ( jnapti), is produced by its intrinsic conditions (svatah), or by some additional conditions (paralah). To confine the discussion to the 'truth' of a cognition, the determinant of svatastva in its origination, comprises all the possible conditions which produce the mere cognition (inana-matrotpadakakarana-samagri), whereas that in its apprehension is included factors which bring about the apprehension of the mere cognition (jnanagrahaka-karana-samagri). A cognition is seid to be originated or apprehended as true externally (paratah), only after some additional necessary conditions are added to either of the afore-said determinants. This topic was first developed by the Mimamsakas concerning the validity of Vedic scriptures as source of all cognitions and as such was basically confined to the scope of verbal testimony (sabda, agama) only, later to have been dealt with in relation to other sources of cognition, or better, to all kinds of cognition. Though the Sanskrit term pramanya may have originally been understood to be equivalent to pramaratva signifying a property in a means of cognition, both of the terms are generally taken, in an epistemological sense, to mean an abstract property ascribed to a true cognition, thus being identical with pramatva. In his Sarvadarsanasamgraha (Jaimini-darsana), Madhava quotes two verses which summarize the views of four principl systems viz, the Samkyaas, Naiyayikas, Bauddhas and Mimamsakas as follows :1 pramanatvaprmanatve svatah samkhyah samasritah, naiyayikas te parathi saugatas caramam svatah. prathamam paratah prahuh pramanyam veda-vadinah, pramanatvam svatah prahuh paratas capramanatvam. Among these four views, the first one seems not to be found in any extant Samkhya text. It might have possibly been dealt with in some of the extinct texts -542 -

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belonging to this system. The view attributed to the Buddhists in the above verse is neither traceable to any available Buddhist texts nor consistent with any tenet found in them. It is very likely that the view in question was either thus psotulated in conformity with the Buddhist doctrine anityatva (ksai ikatva), or maintained by a particular Buddhist school whose source materials have been buried in oblivion long since. In short, the combinations of the two truth values and two-fold determinant mode (svatastva and paratastva) may be tabulated as follows : truth (1) svatah (origination, apprehension) Mimasaka, Sankara-vedantin, Samkhya (2) paratah (origination, apprehension) Nyaya-Vaisesika falsity (1) svatah (origination, apprehension) Samkhya (2) paratah (origination, apprehension) Mimamsaka, Sankara-vedantin, Nyaa-Naisesika Unlike the Nyaya.Vaisesikas and others, the Jainas regard the pramana as a true knowledge which has subjective cognitive fuunction or faculty, and it denotes its resultant cognition as well as its process, a Devasuri (1080-1169) explains in his Pramananayatattvaloka (PNT) that the truth of cognition is the consistency of cognition with the object, and the falsity is the inconsistency of cognition with the object, (I. 18, 19). He further exemplifies the above contention in his own commentary Syadvadaratnakara (SVR) as follows : This consistency of knowledge with the object must be with regard to the object different from the self (=knowledge, cognition), since for anything to be inconsistent with itself is absurd. Thus any cognition is true in relation to itself, and there is no false cognition. On the other hand, in relation to objects other than the self some cognitions are right and the others are false (I. 19).3 And what is established by pramana is its result (anantaryena phalam) and the other is the mediated one (parampar yena phalam) (VI. 1, 2). Out of the two, the mediate result, being that of all kinds of knowledge except for kevalajnana, consists of the judgement of acquiring (upadana), that of abondoning (hana) and that of indifference (upeksa), whereas the former is the annihilation of ignorance (ajnananivstti) which is nothing but the determination of the self and the others (sva-paravyavasiti) (VI. 3, 4, 5). Furthermore, the result is neither exclusively different from nor totally the same as the knowledge (pramana) accordidg to the Jaina theory of non-absolutism (syad-vada); hence the result is, in a way, its pramana (VI. 6, 7, 8). Such being the case, truth is understood to be a property attributed to a true cognition. and is dependent on the consistency with the objects other than the self. Devasuri holds in his PNT that truth and falsity are in their origination and determined externally only, while they are ascertained in their apprehension exter - 543 -

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A nally or internally (1.20). Thus like other Indian realists, the Jainas try to seek truth or falsity in terms of consistency of cognition with objects other than itself, and the truth value is not to be attributed to pramana as a means of cognition. Devasuri further elucidates in SVR that, these values are internally ascertained when the object is well-acquainted by repeated experience (abhyasa-datayam). similar idea is found in the Pariksamukhastra (PM) of Manikyanandin and its commentary Prameyakamalamartanda (PKM) by Prabhacandra, to which Devasuri undoubtedly owed his work. Take for instance one's own palm, one need not resort to any means other than jaanagrahaka, it being internally known to be true. But, in the case of an unacquainted object, the first cognition arises, is followed by voli. tional action to acquire the object (pravrtti), and therefrom the second cognition is obtained. The truth of the first cognition which has produced action towards the object (pravartaka-jaana) is ascertained through the second cognition, in accordance as the latter is a subsequent confirmatory cognition (samvadaka-jnana, samvadin, avisamvadin) or a cognition of pragmatic consequences (arthakriya-jaana) etc. in relation to the former. In this case, the samvadaka-jatana or arthakriya-jaana etc. is accepted to be true by the Jainas, without resorting to further verification, and thus the infinite regress is evaded. So far as the external determination is concerned, truth and falsity in origination and apprehension depend on excellence (guga) and deficiency (dosa) respecti vely; thus the Jainas postulate two distinct positive factors. But suppose a cognition is first originated and apprehended as true, as the Mimamhsakas hold, independent of any other means, and it is changed into a false one only by subsequent deficiencies. Then only one determinant viz. dosa is to be accepted. Does it necessarily follow that the absence of dona which determines the truth might signify nothing but excellence (guya)? On the other hand, if, like the view attributed to the Buddhists by Madhavacarya, falsity is originated and apprehended internally and is developed into truth by subsequent positive factor viz. guya, then is the absence of guya not identical with dosa? All the polemic works dealing with this topic are invariably devoted to the inquiry into the characteristics of guga and doja with a detailed and subtle discussion. Here such controversy is passed over. The peculiarities of the Jaina theory might be summed up as follows: 1. The determination of the truth value of a cognition has been examined hitherto from two-fold aspect viz. utpatti and japti, according to general treatises like SVR etc. However, Prabhacandra (980-1065) in his PKM aud Nyayakumudacandra (NKC) establishes three-fold of division viz. utpatti, jnapti and svakarya." The term sakarya ( the result of pramasa) is intended to conform with the aforesaid phala, as is contrasted with pramaga, which consists of prauptti, niort and upkesa. Though apprehension (jaapti) invariably presupposes, with the exception of the case of a well-acquainted object (abhyasita-visaya), praertti by which to verify - 544

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the truth value, yet pravstti and the like, as the results of pramana, are here postulated for the scrutiny whether such actions are necessarily preceded by the awareness of the truth value viz: truth or falsity. Prabhacandra applies the same rule to the case of sva-karya. The idea of pravstti is here introduced from two distinctive standpoints. In the case of jnapti, pravitt i is employed as a volitional action which determines the truth value, whereas the bone of contention, in the case of svakarya, centrs about whether such responsive behaviour viz. praustti (inclusive of nivetti and upeksa) is determined by the apprehension of the truth value of cognition. Thus pravrtii has a double character; one is to determine the truth value, and the other is to be determined by the truth value. Anantavirya ( 12th cent. ) in his prame yaratnamala, another commentary on PM modelled after PKM, establishes two-fold of division viz, urpatti and sva-karya." In this case, the term sva-karya refers to the two aspects : one is determination of object' (visaya-paricchili) which involves utpatti, and the other is subsequent response towards the object like pravstti etc. Tnis two-fold division seems to be a more faithful interpretation to the original aphorism of PM than Prabhacandra's., in conformity with the afore-said division of peamana and prawiana-phala, whether mediate or immediate. 2. The later Nyaya-Vaisesikas like Vaca spatimigra and Udayana try to avoid infinite regress by postulating some kinds of self-valid knowledge which require no further confirmation. The Jainas also stand on the same footing with them, in saying 'On some occasions truth is apprehended at once, like in the case of primal perceptual cognition unconfirmed by repeated experiences. Since such cognition is never ascertained to stand in unfailing correspondence with the object, its truth is apprehended by a subsequent confirmatory congnitien of the same object, by a cognition of its pragmatic consequences, or by a cognition of object concomitant with it. And the truth of cognition of this kind in self-evident and there is no loophole for the charge of infinite regress.' such a presumption is quite an unescapable fate to those who maintain the external determination of the truth value of cognition. 3. The apprehension (jnopti) is not always fixed either internally or externally. The truth value of any cognition is apprehended from the outset of its origination when the object is well-acquainted by repeated experiences. This is the idea generally held among the Jainas. With all my limited research, it is very likely that Vidyanandin or Manikyanandin was the first Jaina to take up this view.10 However, such theory was not a monopoly of the Jainas alone, but seems to have been borrowed from such Buddhist works as Tattvasamgrahah and its commentary Panjica. In the latter work, four alternatives are first set forth and are finally rejected on the strngth of the view that such manifold congruous combination of two values and two-fold determinant mode (viz, svat astva and paratstva) are of an 69 - 545 -

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unrestricted or unfixed (aniyama) nature. This bone of contention quite agrees with the Jainas. The Navya-naiyayikas also came later to hold a similar view,12 in saying that the truth value of a cognition need not be proved if there is not the slightest doubt about it, and any motiveless doubt of a possible contradiction is of no account. References 1. Sarvadarsanasamgraha, Government Oriental Series, Class A, No. 4, p. 279. 2. The term 'buddhi' synonymous with 'jnana' is generally understood to have three meanings. Athalye explains to this effect in the following way. "First the act of knowing, which may be called 'understanding'; secondly the instrument of knowledge which is 'intellect', and thirdly the product of the act of knowing, which is 'cognition. It is the last sense that the word is invariably used in Nyaya and Vaisesika philosophies." (Tarkasamgraha. Bombay Sanskrit Series, No. LV, second ed., p. 173) There is a divergence of opinions, among scholars, about English equivalents to 'jnana' etc. (Cf. Ingalls, Materials for the Study of NavyaNyaya, p. 29 ft.; Matilal, The Navya-nyaya Doctrine of Negation, p. 6 ft.) In this thesis I have tried to use 'cognition' for the Sanskrit term 'jaana', in the third meaning, so long as the truth value is taken. into consideration in terms of its locus. In Jainism, however, 'jaana' is primarily understood to refer to the first and the second meanings and secondarily even to the third meaning, thus being applicable to the widest denotations, as contrasted with other similar Sanskrit terms. Every school lays an emphsis on a particular aspect denoted by 'jaana', so it seems almost impossible to give a precise English translation to the 'jnana' shared in common by every school. In Jainism, 'pramana' is considered a true knowledge (samyag-jaana). Such being the case, for the terms. 'jnana' and 'pramana' I can hardly give a precise English equivalent, and thus some ambiguity and confusion cannot be avoided. 3. PNT, I. 19, 20, jaanasya prameyavyabhicaritvam pramanyam iti. taditarat tvapramanuam; SVR, Poona edition, p. 240. prameya-vyabhicaritvam ca jnanasya sva-vyatirikta-grahyapeksaiva laksaniyam. svasmin vpabhicaritvasambhavatvat. tena sarvam jaanam svapeksaya pramanam eva na pramanabhasah. bahir-arthapeksaya tu kirp cit pramanam kim cit punas tad-abhasam. 4. PNT, I. 20, tad ubhayam utpattau parata eva jnaptau tu svatah paratas ceti. SVR, p. 249ff. anabhyasa-daayam paratah pratipadyata iti, kutab pratiyata iti cet, anabhyasa-dasayam pramanyam parato janate sama -546

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yapadatvad ity ata iti brumah yadi hi jnanena sva-pramanyam svayam eva jnayeta yathartho-paricchedakam aham astiti, tada pramanapramanam vedam jnaam iti pramanya-samsayah kadacid api notpadyate jna natva-samsayavat. 5. PM, I. 6, tat-pramanyam svatah paratas ceti.; PKM, ed. by Mahenda Kumar, loc. cit., p. 149ff. 6. PKM, p. 149ff.; NKC, ed. by Mahendra Kumar, vol. 1. p. 199ff. 7. Prameyaratnamala, ed. by Phoolcanra & Valacandra, p. 19ff. 8. Nyayauarttikatatparyatika, Kashi Skt. Series 24, p. 13; Nyayavarttika tatpryaparisuddhi, Bib, Ind., pp. 119-120. Pramanamimasa, Singhi Jain Series No. 9, p. 6 (I. 1. viii), kvacit paratah pramany-niscayah, yatha anabhyasa-pasapanne pratyakse. na hi tat arthena glhitavyabhicaram iti tad eka-visayat samvadakata joanatarad va, arthakriya nirbhasad va nantariyartha darsanad va tasya pramanya nisciyate. tesam ca svatah pramanya-niscayan nanavasthadi-dausthyava kaseh. 10. There are no fixed opinions available among scholars about the dates of the said two logicians. Dr. Mahendra Kumar agrees with Pt. Kothiya that Vidyanandin flourished in 775-840, while he fixed the date of Manikyanandin in 993-1053. Cf. Aptapariksa, ed. by Kothiya, Intr. pp. 26-51; Siddhiviniscaya, vol. 1., ed. by Mahendra Kumar, Intr. pp. 49-50. Tattvarthaslokavartika, ed. by Manoharlal, p. 177, tatrabhasat pramanatvam niscitah svata eva nah, anabhyase tu parata ity ahuh pecid amjasa (115). tac ca syadvadinam eva svartha-niscayanat sthitam, na tu svaniseayonmuktanihsesa-joanavacinam (127). kvacid atyantabhyasat syatah pramanatvasya niscayan nanayasthadi-dosah, kvadid ahabhyasat paratas tasya vyavasthiter navyaptir ity etad api syodvadinam eva parmathatah siddhyet svartha-niscayopagamat, na punah svarupa-niscaya-rahita-sakala samveda-vadinam anavasthadyanusamgasya tad-avasthatvat.... 11. Cf. Pramanamimamsa, op. cit., Bhasatippanani, pp. 16-19. Tattvasamgraha, 3100, abhyasikam yatha jnanam yramanam gamyate svatah, mithya-jnanam catha kimcid apramanam svatan sthitam.; Panjika, on 3123, na hi bauddhair esam caturnam ekatamo 'pi pakso' bhisto 'niyama-paksasyestatvat, tatha hi--ubhayam apy eiat kimcit szatah kimcit paratah iti purvam upavarnitam. ata eva paksa-catustayopanyasr 'py ayuktah. pancama-paksasya sambhavat. Tattvacintarnani, Bib. Ind., pp. 277-79, 282-84; S. C. Chatterjee, The Nyaya Theory of Knowledge, p. 99. 12. - 547 -

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lekhasAra jaina prAmANyavAda para eka TippaNI DA0 AtsuzI yUno, hirozimA vizvavidyAlaya, hirozimA, jApAna prAmANyavAda jJAna kI satyatA ko vastuniSTha yA jJAtAniSTha rUpa se vicAra karatA hai / isa para prAyaH sabhI bhAratIya darzanoM ne vicAra kiyA hai| jJAna kA prAmANya do prakAra se saMbhava hai : svataH aura parataH / jJAna-mAtrotpAdaka kAraNa sAmagrI isameM svataH prAmANya utpanna karatI haiM jabaki jJAna-grAhaka-kAraNa sAmagrI se jJAna meM parataH prAmANya AtA hai| prAmANyavAda para sarvaprathama mImAMsakoM ne vicAra kiyA thaa| unhoMne Agama ke AdhAra para jJAna kA prAmANya svIkAra kiyA thaa| sarvadarzana saMgraha meM cAra pramukha bhAratIya darzanoM kA etadviSayaka mata prakaTa kiyA gayA hai jisakA saMkSepaNa nimna haiM : jJAna kA prAmANya (i) svataH (utpatti, jJapti) mImAMsaka, sAMkhya, zaMkara vedAnta (i) parataH (utpatti, jJapti) nyAya-vaizeSika jJAna kA aprAmANya (i) svataH (utpatti, jJapti) : sAMkhya (ii) parataH : mImAMsaka, nyAya, vedAnta nyAya ke viparyAsa meM jaina jJAna ko jJAtAniSThatA ke AdhAra para pramANa mAnate haiN| devasUri ne pramANanayatatvAloka tathA syAdvAdaratnAkara meM isa viSaya meM yahI tathya spaSTa kiyA hai / isake anusAra, utpatti ke samaya prAmANya parataH hI hotA hai jaba ki jJapti ke samaya yaha svataH bhI ho sakatA hai aura parataH bhI ho sakatA hai| isa viSaya meM parIkSAmukha tathA prameyakamalamAttaMDa bhI draSTavya haiN| ___ jJAna kA prAmANya, utpatti yA jJapti dazA meM guNa-doSoM para nirbhara karatA hai| doSoM ke kAraNa jJAna meM aprAmANya AtA hai| mImAMsakoM aura bauddhoM ne ina guNoM aura doSoM para vicAra kiyA hai| lekina jaina dArzanikoM ne isa para vizeSa carcA nahIM kI hai| prAmANyavAda ke saMbaMdha meM jaina mata ko nimna prakAra saMkSepita kiyA jA sakatA hai : (1) jJAna ke prAmANya kA vicAra utpatti tathA jJapti dazA ke AdhAra para kiyA jAtA hai / prabhAcaMdra ne isameM svakArya kI tIsarI dazA bhI jor3a dI hai| jJapti ke lie pravRtti Avazyaka hai jo aicchika kriyA para nirbhara karatI hai| yaha pravRtti na kevala jJAna ko pramANatA detI hai apitu isakA nirdhAraNa bhI pramANatA ke AdhAra para hI hotA hai| anantavIrya ne prameyaratnamAlA meM prAmANya ko utpatti evaM svakArya dazA meM viSaya paricchitti aura pravRtti ke rUpa meM nirUpita kiyA hai| (II) nyAya-vaizeSikoM ke samAna jainoM ne bhI anavasthA ko dUra karane ke lie kucha svayaM siddha jJAna mAne haiM jinakA prAmANya siddha karane kI AvazyakatA nahIM hai| (III) jJapti ke viSaya meM yaha nizcita nahIM rahatA ki yaha svataH hI hotI hai yA parataH / yaha jJAnotpatti kI dazA evaM vastu-paricaya para nirbhara karatI hai / vidyAnaMdi aura mANikyanaMdi kA yaha mata tatvasaMgraha aura usakI paMjikA ke samAna granthoM ke AdhAra para banA pratIta hotA hai| navya naiyAyikoM ne bhI bAda meM isI ke anurUpa mata svIkAra kiyA hai| -548