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SOME REMARKS ON THE PRAMANYA-VADA OF JAINISM
Dr. Atsushi Uno, Hiroshima University, Hiroshima, Japan
The prāmānya-vada deals with a problem how the truth value of a cognition is determined objectively and subjectively. This has for a long time been of interest to all the Indian philosophical systems, as was the problem of the knowledge and the means thereof. As regards the determination of the truth value of a cognition, viz. truth (prāmānya) and falsity (aprāmānya), most of the philosophical systems accept either of the two alternatives : whether the truth value of cognition, in origination (utpatti) and apprehension ( jñapti), is produced by its intrinsic conditions (svatah), or by some additional conditions (paralah). To confine the discussion to the 'truth' of a cognition, the determinant of svatastva in its origination, comprises all the possible conditions which produce the mere cognition (iñana-mātrotpadakakāraṇa-samagri), whereas that in its apprehension is included factors which bring about the apprehension of the mere cognition (jñānagrāhaka-kāraṇa-sāmagri). A cognition is seid to be originated or apprehended as true externally (parataḥ), only after some additional necessary conditions are added to either of the afore-said determinants.
This topic was first developed by the Mimāṁsakas concerning the validity of Vedic scriptures as source of all cognitions and as such was basically confined to the scope of verbal testimony (sabda, āgama) only, later to have been dealt with in relation to other sources of cognition, or better, to all kinds of cognition. Though the Sanskrit term prāmānya may have originally been understood to be equivalent to prāmāratva signifying a property in a means of cognition, both of the terms are generally taken, in an epistemological sense, to mean an abstract property ascribed to a true cognition, thus being identical with pramātva.
In his Sarvadarśanasamgraha (Jaimini-darśana), Mādhava quotes two verses which summarize the views of four principl systems viz, the Sāṁkyaas, Naiyāyikas, Bauddhas and Mimāṁsakas as follows :1
pramānatvāprmāṇatve svataḥ sāṁkhyāḥ samāśritāḥ, naiyāyikās te parathì saugatās caramam svataḥ. prathamam parataḥ prāhuḥ prämänyam veda-vādinah,
pramāṇatvam svatah prāhuḥ paratas cāpramäņatvam. Among these four views, the first one seems not to be found in any extant Sämkhya text. It might have possibly been dealt with in some of the extinct texts
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belonging to this system. The view attributed to the Buddhists in the above verse is neither traceable to any available Buddhist texts nor consistent with any tenet found in them. It is very likely that the view in question was either thus psotulated in conformity with the Buddhist doctrine anityatva (ksai ikatva), or maintained by a particular Buddhist school whose source materials have been buried in oblivion long since.
In short, the combinations of the two truth values and two-fold determinant mode (svatastva and paratastva) may be tabulated as follows :
truth (1) svataḥ (origination, apprehension)
Mimasaka, Sankara-vedāntin, Samkhya (2) paratah (origination, apprehension)
Nyāya-Vaiseșika falsity (1) svatah (origination, apprehension)
Sāṁkhya (2) paratah (origination, apprehension)
Mimāṁsaka, Sănkara-vedāntin, Nyāa-Naiseşika Unlike the Nyāya.Vaiseșikas and others, the Jainas regard the pramāna as a true knowledge which has subjective cognitive fuunction or faculty, and it denotes its resultant cognition as well as its process, a Devasūri (1080-1169) explains in his Pramānanayatattväloka (PNT) that the truth of cognition is the consistency of cognition with the object, and the falsity is the inconsistency of cognition with the object, (I. 18, 19). He further exemplifies the above contention in his own commentary Syādvādaratnākara (SVR) as follows : This consistency of knowledge with the object must be with regard to the object different from the self (=knowledge, cognition), since for anything to be inconsistent with itself is absurd. Thus any cognition is true in relation to itself, and there is no false cognition. On the other hand, in relation to objects other than the self some cognitions are right and the others are false (I. 19).3 And what is established by pramāna is its result (anantaryena phalam) and the other is the mediated one (pārampar yeņa phalam) (VI. 1, 2). Out of the two, the mediate result, being that of all kinds of knowledge except for kevalajñāna, consists of the judgement of acquiring (upādāna), that of abondoning (hāna) and that of indifference (upeksā), whereas the former is the annihilation of ignorance (ajñānanivstti) which is nothing but the determination of the self and the others (sva-paravyavasiti) (VI. 3, 4, 5). Furthermore, the result is neither exclusively different from nor totally the same as the knowledge (pramāna) accordidg to the Jaina theory of non-absolutism (syād-vāda); hence the result is, in a way, its pramāņa (VI. 6, 7, 8). Such being the case, truth is understood to be a property attributed to a true cognition. and is dependent on the consistency with the objects other than the self.
Devasūri holds in his PNT that truth and falsity are in their origination and determined externally only, while they are ascertained in their apprehension exter
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A
nally or internally (1.20). Thus like other Indian realists, the Jainas try to seek truth or falsity in terms of consistency of cognition with objects other than itself, and the truth value is not to be attributed to pramāņa as a means of cognition. Devasuri further elucidates in SVR that, these values are internally ascertained when the object is well-acquainted by repeated experience (abhyasa-datāyām). similar idea is found in the Parikṣamukhastra (PM) of Manikyanandin and its commentary Prameyakamalamartanda (PKM) by Prabhäcandra, to which Devasüri undoubtedly owed his work. Take for instance one's own palm, one need not resort to any means other than jäänagrähaka, it being internally known to be true. But, in the case of an unacquainted object, the first cognition arises, is followed by voli. tional action to acquire the object (pravṛtti), and therefrom the second cognition is obtained. The truth of the first cognition which has produced action towards the object (pravartaka-jääna) is ascertained through the second cognition, in accordance as the latter is a subsequent confirmatory cognition (samvadaka-jñāna, samvadin, avisamvadin) or a cognition of pragmatic consequences (arthakriya-jääna) etc. in relation to the former. In this case, the samvadakā-jätäna or arthakriya-jääna etc. is accepted to be true by the Jainas, without resorting to further verification, and thus the infinite regress is evaded.
So far as the external determination is concerned, truth and falsity in origination and apprehension depend on excellence (guga) and deficiency (dosa) respecti vely; thus the Jainas postulate two distinct positive factors. But suppose a cognition is first originated and apprehended as true, as the Mimamhsakas hold, independent of any other means, and it is changed into a false one only by subsequent deficiencies. Then only one determinant viz. doșa is to be accepted. Does it necessarily follow that the absence of doña which determines the truth might signify nothing but excellence (guya)? On the other hand, if, like the view attributed to the Buddhists by Madhavacarya, falsity is originated and apprehended internally and is developed into truth by subsequent positive factor viz. guya, then is the absence of guya not identical with dosa? All the polemic works dealing with this topic are invariably devoted to the inquiry into the characteristics of guga and doja with a detailed and subtle discussion. Here such controversy is passed over.
The peculiarities of the Jaina theory might be summed up as follows:
1. The determination of the truth value of a cognition has been examined hitherto from two-fold aspect viz. utpatti and japti, according to general treatises like SVR etc. However, Prabhācandra (980-1065) in his PKM aud Nyayakumudacandra (NKC) establishes three-fold of division viz. utpatti, jñapti and svakärya." The term sakarya ( the result of pramaşa) is intended to conform with the aforesaid phala, as is contrasted with pramaga, which consists of prauptti, niort and upkesa.
Though apprehension (jääpti) invariably presupposes, with the exception of the case of a well-acquainted object (abhyasita-visaya), praertti by which to verify
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the truth value, yet pravștti and the like, as the results of pramāņa, are here postulated for the scrutiny whether such actions are necessarily preceded by the awareness of the truth value viz: truth or falsity. Prabhācandra applies the same rule to the case of sva-karya. The idea of pravștti is here introduced from two distinctive standpoints. In the case of jñāpti, pravítt i is employed as a volitional action which determines the truth value, whereas the bone of contention, in the case of svakārya, centrs about whether such responsive behaviour viz. praustti (inclusive of nivetti and upeksä) is determined by the apprehension of the truth value of cognition. Thus pravrtii has a double character; one is to determine the truth value, and the other is to be determined by the truth value.
Anantavirya ( 12th cent. ) in his prame yaratnamālā, another commentary on PM modelled after PKM, establishes two-fold of division viz, urpatti and sva-kārya." In this case, the term sva-kārya refers to the two aspects : one is determination of object' (visaya-paricchili) which involves utpatti, and the other is subsequent response towards the object like pravștti etc. Tnis two-fold division seems to be a more faithful interpretation to the original aphorism of PM than Prabhācandra's., in conformity with the afore-said division of peamāna and prawiāņa-phala, whether mediate or immediate.
2. The later Nyāya-Vaiseșikas like Vāca spatimigra and Udayana try to avoid infinite regress by postulating some kinds of self-valid knowledge which require no further confirmation. The Jainas also stand on the same footing with them, in saying 'On some occasions truth is apprehended at once, like in the case of primal perceptual cognition unconfirmed by repeated experiences. Since such cognition is never ascertained to stand in unfailing correspondence with the object, its truth is apprehended by a subsequent confirmatory congnitien of the same object, by a cognition of its pragmatic consequences, or by a cognition of object concomitant with it. And the truth of cognition of this kind in self-evident and there is no loophole for the charge of infinite regress.' such a presumption is quite an unescapable fate to those who maintain the external determination of the truth value of cognition.
3. The apprehension (jñopti) is not always fixed either internally or externally. The truth value of any cognition is apprehended from the outset of its origination when the object is well-acquainted by repeated experiences. This is the idea generally held among the Jainas. With all my limited research, it is very likely that Vidyānandin or Māņikyanandin was the first Jaina to take up this view.10 However, such theory was not a monopoly of the Jainas alone, but seems to have been borrowed from such Buddhist works as Tattvasamgrahah and its commentary Pañjică. In the latter work, four alternatives are first set forth and are finally rejected on the strngth of the view that such manifold congruous combination of two values and two-fold determinant mode (viz, svat astva and paratstva) are of an
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unrestricted or unfixed (aniyama) nature. This bone of contention quite agrees with the Jainas. The Navya-naiyayikas also came later to hold a similar view,12 in saying that the truth value of a cognition need not be proved if there is not the slightest doubt about it, and any motiveless doubt of a possible contradiction is of
no account.
References
1. Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha, Government Oriental Series, Class A, No. 4, p. 279.
2. The term 'buddhi' synonymous with 'jñāna' is generally understood to have three meanings. Athalye explains to this effect in the following way. "First the act of knowing, which may be called 'understanding'; secondly the instrument of knowledge which is 'intellect', and thirdly the product of the act of knowing, which is 'cognition. It is the last sense that the word is invariably used in Nyaya and Vaiseşika philosophies." (Tarkasamgraha. Bombay Sanskrit Series, No. LV, second ed., p. 173)
There is a divergence of opinions, among scholars, about English equivalents to 'jñāna' etc. (Cf. Ingalls, Materials for the Study of NavyaNyaya, p. 29 ft.; Matilal, The Navya-nyaya Doctrine of Negation, p. 6 ft.) In this thesis I have tried to use 'cognition' for the Sanskrit term 'jääna', in the third meaning, so long as the truth value is taken. into consideration in terms of its locus. In Jainism, however, 'jääna' is primarily understood to refer to the first and the second meanings and secondarily even to the third meaning, thus being applicable to the widest denotations, as contrasted with other similar Sanskrit terms. Every school lays an emphsis on a particular aspect denoted by 'jääna', so it seems almost impossible to give a precise English translation to the 'jñāna' shared in common by every school. In Jainism, 'pramaņa' is considered a true knowledge (samyag-jääna). Such being the case, for the terms. 'jñana' and 'pramäṇa' I can hardly give a precise English equivalent, and thus some ambiguity and confusion cannot be avoided.
3. PNT, I. 19, 20, jäänasya prameyavyabhicaritvam prämäṇyam iti. taditarat tvapramänуam; SVR, Poona edition, p. 240. prameya-vyabhicăritvam ca jñānasya sva-vyatirikta-grāhyāpekṣaiva lakṣaṇiyam. svasmin vpabhicäritväsambhavatvät. tena sarvam jäänaṁ svapekṣayā pramāņam eva na pramäṇābhasah. bahir-arthäpekṣaya tu kirp cit pramäṇaṁ kim cit punas tad-abhāsam.
4. PNT, I. 20, tad ubhayam utpattau parata eva jñaptau tu svatah paratas ceti. SVR, p. 249ff. anabhyasa-daäyäṁ paratah pratipadyata iti, kutab pratiyata iti cet, anabhyasa-daśāyām pramanyam parato janate sama
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yāpadatvād ity ata iti brūmah yadi hi jñānena sva-pramanyam svayam eva jñāyeta yathārtho-paricchedakam aham astiti, tada pramāṇāpramaņam vedam jñāam iti prămânya-samsayaḥ kadācid api notpadyate jñā
natva-samsayavat. 5. PM, I. 6, tat-prämānyam svatah paratas ceti.; PKM, ed. by Mahenda
Kumar, loc. cit., p. 149ff. 6. PKM, p. 149ff.; NKC, ed. by Mahendra Kumar, vol. 1. p. 199ff. 7. Prameyaratnamālā, ed. by Phoolcanra & Vālacandra, p. 19ff. 8. Nyāyāuārttikatātparyaţikā, Kashi Skt. Series 24, p. 13; Nyāyavārttika
tātpryaparisuddhi, Bib, Ind., pp. 119-120. Pramāṇamimāsā, Singhi Jain Series No. 9, p. 6 (I. 1. viii), kvacit parataḥ prāmāny-niscayaḥ, yathä anabhyāsa-paśāpanne pratyakṣe. na hi tat arthena gļhităvyabhicāram iti tad eka-viṣayāt samvādakāta jõānātarād vā, arthakriyā nirbhāsād vā nāntariyārtha darsanād vä tasya prāmānya niściyate. teşāṁ ca svataḥ prāmānya-niscayān nānavasthädi-dausthyāva
kaseh. 10. There are no fixed opinions available among scholars about the dates of
the said two logicians. Dr. Mahendra Kumar agrees with Pt. Kothiya that Vidyānandin flourished in 775-840, while he fixed the date of Mānikyanandin in 993-1053. Cf. Aptaparikșă, ed. by Kothiya, Intr. pp. 26-51; Siddhiviniscaya, vol. 1., ed. by Mahendra Kumar, Intr. pp. 49-50. Tattvārthaślokavārtika, ed. by Manoharlal, p. 177, tatrābhāsāt pramāņatvam niscitaḥ svata eva nah, anabhyāse tu parata ity āhuḥ pecid amjasā (115). tac ca syādvādinām eva svārtha-niscayanāt sthitam, na tu svaniseayonmuktanihseșa-jõänavācinām (127). kvacid atyantābhyāsāt syatah pramānatvasya niscayān nānayasthādi-dosah, kvadid ahabhyāsāt paratas tasya vyavasthiter nāvyāptir ity etad api syödvādinām eva parmāthataḥ siddhyet svārtha-niscayopagamāt, na punaḥ svarūpa-niscaya-rahita-sakala
samveda-vādinām anavasthādyanusamgasya tad-avasthatvāt.... 11. Cf. Pramāṇamimāmsä, op. cit., Bhäşātippaņāni, pp. 16-19.
Tattvasamgraha, 3100, abhyasikaṁ yathā jñānaṁ yramāņam gamyate svataḥ, mithya-jñānam cathā kimcid apramāņam svatan sthitam.; Pañjika, on 3123, na hi bauddhair eşāṁ caturņām ekatamo 'pi pakşo' bhisto 'niyama-pakşasyestatvāt, tathā hi--ubhayam apy eiat kimcit szataḥ kimcit parataḥ iti pūrvam upavarnitam. ata eva paksa-catuștayopanyasr 'py ayuktah. pañcama-pakşasya sambhavät. Tattvacintärnani, Bib. Ind., pp. 277-79, 282-84; S. C. Chatterjee, The Nyāya Theory of Knowledge, p. 99.
12.
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________________ लेखसार जैन प्रामाण्यवाद पर एक टिप्पणी डा० आत्सुशी यूनो, हिरोशिमा विश्वविद्यालय, हिरोशिमा, जापान प्रामाण्यवाद ज्ञान की सत्यता को वस्तुनिष्ठ या ज्ञातानिष्ठ रूप से विचार करता है / इस पर प्रायः सभी भारतीय दर्शनों ने विचार किया है। ज्ञान का प्रामाण्य दो प्रकार से संभव है : स्वतः और परतः / ज्ञान-मात्रोत्पादक कारण सामग्री इसमें स्वतः प्रामाण्य उत्पन्न करती हैं जबकि ज्ञान-ग्राहक-कारण सामग्री से ज्ञान में परतः प्रामाण्य आता है। प्रामाण्यवाद पर सर्वप्रथम मीमांसकों ने विचार किया था। उन्होंने आगम के आधार पर ज्ञान का प्रामाण्य स्वीकार किया था। सर्वदर्शन संग्रह में चार प्रमुख भारतीय दर्शनों का एतद्विषयक मत प्रकट किया गया है जिसका संक्षेपण निम्न हैं : ज्ञान का प्रामाण्य (i) स्वतः (उत्पत्ति, ज्ञप्ति) मीमांसक, सांख्य, शंकर वेदान्त (i) परतः (उत्पत्ति, ज्ञप्ति) न्याय-वैशेषिक ज्ञान का अप्रामाण्य (i) स्वतः (उत्पत्ति, ज्ञप्ति) : सांख्य (ii) परतः : मीमांसक, न्याय, वेदान्त न्याय के विपर्यास में जैन ज्ञान को ज्ञातानिष्ठता के आधार पर प्रमाण मानते हैं। देवसूरि ने प्रमाणनयतत्वालोक तथा स्याद्वादरत्नाकर में इस विषय में यही तथ्य स्पष्ट किया है / इसके अनुसार, उत्पत्ति के समय प्रामाण्य परतः ही होता है जब कि ज्ञप्ति के समय यह स्वतः भी हो सकता है और परतः भी हो सकता है। इस विषय में परीक्षामुख तथा प्रमेयकमलमात्तंड भी द्रष्टव्य हैं। ___ ज्ञान का प्रामाण्य, उत्पत्ति या ज्ञप्ति दशा में गुण-दोषों पर निर्भर करता है। दोषों के कारण ज्ञान में अप्रामाण्य आता है। मीमांसकों और बौद्धों ने इन गुणों और दोषों पर विचार किया है। लेकिन जैन दार्शनिकों ने इस पर विशेष चर्चा नहीं की है। प्रामाण्यवाद के संबंध में जैन मत को निम्न प्रकार संक्षेपित किया जा सकता है : (1) ज्ञान के प्रामाण्य का विचार उत्पत्ति तथा ज्ञप्ति दशा के आधार पर किया जाता है / प्रभाचंद्र ने इसमें स्वकार्य की तीसरी दशा भी जोड़ दी है। ज्ञप्ति के लिए प्रवृत्ति आवश्यक है जो ऐच्छिक क्रिया पर निर्भर करती है। यह प्रवृत्ति न केवल ज्ञान को प्रमाणता देती है अपितु इसका निर्धारण भी प्रमाणता के आधार पर ही होता है। अनन्तवीर्य ने प्रमेयरत्नमाला में प्रामाण्य को उत्पत्ति एवं स्वकार्य दशा में विषय परिच्छित्ति और प्रवृत्ति के रूप में निरूपित किया है। (II) न्याय-वैशेषिकों के समान जैनों ने भी अनवस्था को दूर करने के लिए कुछ स्वयं सिद्ध ज्ञान माने हैं जिनका प्रामाण्य सिद्ध करने की आवश्यकता नहीं है। (III) ज्ञप्ति के विषय में यह निश्चित नहीं रहता कि यह स्वतः ही होती है या परतः / यह ज्ञानोत्पत्ति की दशा एवं वस्तु-परिचय पर निर्भर करती है / विद्यानंदि और माणिक्यनंदि का यह मत तत्वसंग्रह और उसकी पंजिका के समान ग्रन्थों के आधार पर बना प्रतीत होता है। नव्य नैयायिकों ने भी बाद में इसी के अनुरूप मत स्वीकार किया है। -548